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ABSTRACT

Nine articles discuss the nature and structure of public scholarship. The articles are: (1) "Divided No More" by Parker J. Palmer, who urges academics to act publicly on their convictions; (2) "The Public Intellectual as Transgressor?" by William M. Sullivan, who urges the reinvention of a "public" orientation to intellectual life within higher education; (3) "Public Scholarship" by Jay Rosen, who describes the Project on Public Life and the Press and urges both journalists and scholars to learn more about public life by leading public lives; (4) "In Whose Favor Am I Teaching?" by Janice L. Lucas, who uses an experience with a student to illustrate the need to go beyond the curriculum in addressing private issues that have become public problems; (5) "The Public Scholar Who Never Was" by James Norment, who questions the graduate training system for its avoidance of the essential tensions in personal and public reflection; (6) "Academic Professionalism and the New Public Mindedness" by Maria M. Farland, who offers evidence of an interest in the public by academics; (7) "Education for Political Life" by Alejandro Sanz de Santamaria, a professor in Colombia, who regrets a life divided between the academy and the community; (8) "Marketing the Mind" by Robert F. Gish, who expresses concern about the adoption of corporate management, production, and marketing strategies by universities; and (9) "Inventing Public Scholarship" by David Mathews, who considers the meaning of public scholarship from various viewpoints. (Some papers contain references.) (MAH)

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

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

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1996

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FOREWORD

By Deborah Witte

This issue of the *Higher Education Exchange* continues the theme of public scholarship introduced in the 1995 issue. Gathered here are nine essays, each of which addresses one or more aspects of public scholarship. Among the topics addressed by these articles are the disconnected/divided life of the scholar-citizen; the consequences of specialization and professionalization on our campuses; and the need for communication and dialogue, especially deliberative dialogue between scholars and the public. All of the essays pose questions about the nature and structure of public scholarship, for we are all, to use David Mathews' words, groping for an understanding of this idea.

A reprinted piece by Parker Palmer begins this issue. While the *Higher Education Exchange* does not usually reprint material published elsewhere, editor David Brown and I thought it important to reprint certain pieces that serve as a starting point for defining and understanding public scholarship. Other reprinted essays also appearing in this issue are a piece by Alejandro Sanz de Santamaria and a speech of William Sullivan's.

In the first essay, Palmer implores us "to go 'public' … to enter one's convictions into the mix of communal discourse"; to make "the decision to stop leading a divided life." He asserts, "the decision to stop leading a divided life is less a strategy for altering other people's values than an uprising of the elemental need for one's own values to come to the fore." This articulation of the idea of a divided life helps us realize that, to be a public scholar, one must be *in* the world as well as *of* the world.

William M. Sullivan, in his piece, echoes Palmer's concern about the divided life, which he characterizes as a disconnect. He offers a brief history of the role of the university and the public intellectual in everyday life and articulates one problem facing the university today: "a spreading skepticism about the claim of experts to speak for or about the public interest and even to delegitimate the claims of expert knowledge and its supporting institutions, especially the university." He fears "the elites … only

reluctantly engage in the kind of public discussion that matters most to Americans." It is this context, he claims, "which gives urgency to the reinvention of a 'public' orientation to intellectual life within higher education." He asks "whether [higher education] has the ability and the will to respond through leadership, institutional design, teaching, and research, in creating a new form of intellectual life for the public good."

The next piece, an interview with journalism professor Jay Rosen, articulates yet another definition of public scholarship. Rosen suggests, "public scholars begin with the realization that they don't know something and the something can only be known in one way: through a process of inquiry conducted with others in public." The Project on Public Life and the Press (more colloquially known as public journalism) that Rosen heads is a way for journalists to interact with the public, a way of "creating space for reflection and discussion." Rosen offers this thought: "journalists and scholars learn about public life by leading public lives."

Five personal narratives follow these three opening essays. Janice Lucas, a professor at Gulf Coast Community College, tells of a student caught up in the violence around him, a story, for Lucas, about coping with the divided life of teacher and learner. She struggles with defining the connection among her public actions, her profession, and her private life by asking questions about how she should act. She reflects on her attempts to go beyond the curriculum and on how she encourages her students to reflect on their public lives and the consequences. Lucas believes "college ought to be a space for addressing private issues that have become public problems."

The next essay, by James Norment, is also full of questions, both real and rhetorical, these about graduate education. As a young scholar intent on pursuing knowledge as well as a genuine relationship with the public, Norment finds himself on the outside looking in. He feels the "system of graduate education has turned its back" on him and his fellow graduate students, and implores academics to "consider more thoroughly the sort of graduate education scholars provide to graduate students." He asks, "How can professional academics collaborate with graduate students in ways that encourage public problem solving, engagement, and deliberation? What good are indecipherable 'academic' discussions held not in *conjunction with* [the public] but *instead of* public engagement? How does [the] graduate training system discourage

students from integrating course work and original research with public concerns, relationships, or information?" Norment questions whether graduate training from the very beginning "avoid[s] essential tensions in personal and public reflection." He paints a rather pessimistic picture from his position outside the academy, refusing to live a divided life.

Maria Farland, a young scholar at Johns Hopkins University, tries, in part, to answer some of Norment's questions in her essay. Speaking from inside the academy, she holds a somewhat more optimistic view. She sees overwhelming evidence of an interest in the public in the more than 700 applications the university has received so far in response to a recent job search. She tells of an applicant who works with Educators for the Public Sector, a group that works to raise awareness about the public on campuses. Another candidate is involved in convening public forums and sees them as important to her role as a citizen/scholar. She finds many examples "where today's academic professionals [are] begin[ning] to examine what it means to be 'public,' opening new opportunities for a resurgence of 'civic professionalism.'" Yet Farland shares a bit of Norment's pessimism also. She worries that the "academic professionals have made the public a category for intellectual analysis and study," perpetuating the divided life that Parker Palmer identifies.

The next personal story comes from an international contributor. Alejandro Sanz de Santamaria is a professor of economics at the Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia. Though his university is some distance from the universities talked about in the preceding essays, the problems they face are identical. Sanz, like most of the other authors here, lives a life divided between the academy and the community. In his article he reasons why we need to meld the two together. He shares with us his story of trying to bridge the gap between his field of economics and one rural community, Garcia Rovira. He tells us, "life and mind are separated in the classroom and research practice, and this separation carries with it profound and harmful contradictions. We 'teach' one type of politics at the discursive level, and we 'do' a different politics in our practices in the classroom." Living a divided life is harmful and produces "tyrants who are intellectual experts on democracy."

In the last narrative, Robert F. Gish shares William Sullivan's concern for the false dichotomy of the putative "two cultures" of

art and science. But of even more concern to him is the adoption of corporate management, production, and marketing strategies by universities. He worries about the "growing political and business-oriented marketing of the mind" and is still convinced "that general education and its concerns are the center of every university worth its corn or its saltwater.

Finally, David Mathews provides yet another way of thinking about and defining public scholarship. He draws on scholars such as Thomas Bender and Robert Putnam to explore what public scholarship might mean. Communication, especially deliberative dialogue, is essential to public life, a theme echoed by Alejandro Sanz de Santamaria. Public scholars are "defined, in part, by how they go about producing knowledge, by the kinds of questions they raise, and most of all, by the richness of their concept of public life." He further asserts, "they can be identified by the way they *stand* in relation to the public. Public scholars stand *with* other citizens."

We invite you to join in examining the questions posed in these essays, and to join in exploring what public life might be if academics and administrators were to rethink their professional orientations. Echoing David Mathews, let us hear from you.

DIVIDED NO MORE

A Movement Approach to Educational Reform

By Parker J. Palmer

As I travel the country talking with faculty about the reform of teaching and learning, I meet many people who care about the subject and who have compelling visions for change. But after we have talked a while, our conversations take an almost inevitable turn. "These are wonderful ideas," someone will say, "but every last one of them will be defeated by the conditions of academic life."

That claim is usually followed by a litany of impediments to institutional reform: Teaching has low status in the academy, tenure decisions favor those who publish, scarce dollars will always go to research (or to administration, or to bricks and mortar), etc. No matter how hopeful our previous conversation has been, these reminders of institutional gridlock create a mood of resignation, even despair — and the game feels lost before play has begun.

The constancy of this experience has forced me to think more carefully about how change really happens. I have found myself revisiting an old but helpful distinction between an *organizational* approach and a *movement* approach to change. Both organizations and movements are valuable, worthy of leadership, and channels for change — and a healthy society will encourage symbiosis between the two (indeed, reform-minded administrators often welcome movement energies). But when an organizational mentality is imposed on a problem that requires movement sensibilities, the result is often despair. I believe that some of us are making precisely that mistake when it comes to the reform of teaching and learning.

The organizational approach to change is premised on the notion that bureaucracies — their rules, roles, and relationships — define the limits of social reality within which change must happen. Organizations are essentially arrangements of power, so this approach to change asks: "How can the power contained within the boxes of this organization be rearranged or redirected to

achieve the desired goal?" That is a good question — except when it assumes that bureaucracies are the only game in town.

This approach pits entrenched patterns of corporate power against fragile images of change harbored by a minority of individuals, and the match is inherently unfair. Constrained by this model, people with a vision for change may devote themselves to persuading powerholders to see things their way, which drains energy away from the vision and breeds resentment among the visionaries when "permission" is not granted. When organizations seem less interested in change than in preservation (which is, after all, their job), would-be reformers are likely to give up if the organizational approach is the only one they know.



But our obsession with the organizational model may suggest something more sinister than mere ignorance of another way. We sometimes get perverse satisfaction from insisting that organizations offer the only path to change. Then, when the path is blocked, we can indulge the luxury of resentment rather than seek an alternative avenue of reform — and we can blame it all on external forces rather than take responsibility upon ourselves.

There is a part of human nature that would rather remain hopeless than take the risk of new life. It is not uncommon for academics to be driven by this "death wish," even (and perhaps especially) the most idealistic among us. The most vigorous resistance to the movement model may come from reformers who have been defeated on one front and are too weary to open another. Sometimes it is easier to live with the comfort of despair than with the challenge of knowing that change can happen despite the inertia of organizations.

The Movement Way

But there is another avenue toward change: The way of the movement. I began to understand movements when I saw the simple fact that nothing would ever have changed if reformers had allowed themselves to be done in by organizational resistance. Many of us experience such resistance as checkmate to our hopes for change. But for a movement, resistance is merely the place where things begin. The movement mentality, far from being defeated by organizational resistance, takes energy from opposi-

tion. Opposition validates the audacious idea that change must come.

The black liberation movement and the women's movement would have died aborning if racist and sexist organizations had been allowed to define the rules of engagement. But for some blacks, and for some women, that resistance affirmed and energized the struggle. In both movements, advocates of change found sources of countervailing power outside the organizational structures, and they nurtured that power in ways that eventually gave them immense leverage on organizations.

The genius of movements is paradoxical: They abandon the logic of organizations in order to gather the power necessary to rewrite the logic of organizations. Both the black movement and the women's movement grew outside of organizational boundaries — but both returned to change the lay, and the law, of the land. I believe that the reform of teaching and learning will happen only if we who care about it learn to live this paradox.

What is the logic of a movement? How does a movement unfold and progress? I see four definable stages in the movements I have studied — stages that do not unfold as neatly as this list suggests, but often overlap and circle back on each other:

- Isolated individuals decide to stop leading "divided lives."
- These people discover each other and form groups for mutual support.
- Empowered by community, they learn to translate "private problems" into public issues.
- Alternative rewards emerge to sustain the movement's vision, which may force the conventional reward system to change.

I want to explore these stages here, but not simply in remembrance of things past. By understanding the stages of a movement, some of us may see more clearly that we are engaged in a movement today, that we hold real power in our hands — a form of power that has driven real change in recent times. Knowing our power, perhaps we will have less need or desire to succumb to the sweet despair of believing that organizational gridlock must have the last word.

Choosing Integrity

The first stage in a movement can be described with some precision, I think. It happens when isolated individuals make an inner

choice to stop leading "divided lives." Most of us know from experience what a divided life is. Inwardly we feel one sort of imperative for our lives, but outwardly we respond to quite another. This is the human condition, of course: our inner and outer worlds will never be in perfect harmony. But there are extremes of dividedness that become intolerable, and when the tension snaps inside of this person, then that person, and then another, a movement may be under way.

The decision to stop leading a divided life, made by enough people over a period of time, may eventually have political impact. But at the outset, it is a deeply personal decision, taken for the sake of personal integrity and wholeness. I call it the "Rosa Parks decision" in honor of the woman who decided, one hot Alabama day in 1955, that she finally would sit at the front of the bus.

Rosa Parks' decision was neither random nor taken in isolation. She served as secretary for the local NAACP, had studied social change at the Highlander Folk School, and was aware of others' hopes to organize a bus boycott. But her motive that day in Montgomery was not to spark the modern civil rights movement. Years later, she explained her decision with a simple but powerful image of personal wholeness: "I sat down because my feet were tired."

I suspect we can say even more: Rosa Parks sat at the front of the bus because her soul was tired of the vast, demoralizing gap between knowing herself as fully human and collaborating with a system that denied her humanity. The decision to stop leading a divided life is less a strategy for altering other people's values than an uprising of the elemental need for one's own values to come to the fore. The power of a movement lies less in attacking some enemy's untruth than in naming and claiming a truth of one's own.

There is immense energy for change in such inward decisions as they leap from one person to another and outward to the society. With these decisions, individuals may set in motion a process that creates change from the inside out. There is an irony here: We often think of movements as "confrontational," as hammering away at social structures until the sinners inside repent — and we contrast them (often invidiously) with the "slow, steady, faithful" process of working for change from within the organization. In truth, people who take an organizational approach to problems often become obsessed with their unyielding "enemies," while peo-

ple who adopt a movement approach must begin by changing themselves.

I meet teachers around the country who are choosing integrity in ways reminiscent of Rosa Parks. These faculty have realized that even if teaching is a back-of-the-bus thing for their institutions, it is a front-of-the-bus thing for them. They have realized that a passion for teaching was what animated their decision to enter the academy, and they do not want to lose the primal energy of their professional lives. They have realized that they care deeply about the lives of their students, and they do not want to abandon the young. They have realized that teaching is an enterprise in which they have a heavy investment of personal identity and meaning — and they have decided to reinvest their lives, even if they do not receive dividends from their colleges or from their colleagues.



For these teachers, the decision is really quite simple: Caring about teaching and about students brings them health as persons, and to collaborate in a denial of that fact is to collaborate in a diminishment of their own lives. They refuse any longer to act outwardly in contradiction to something they know inwardly to be true — that teaching, and teaching well, is a source of identity for them. They understand that this refusal may evoke the wrath of the gods of the professions, who are often threatened when we reach for personal wholeness. But still, they persist.

What drives such a decision, with all its risks? The difference between a person who stays at the back of the bus and "sits on it" and one who finally decides to sit up front is probably lost in the mystery of human courage. But courage is stimulated by the simple insight that my oppression is not simply the result of mindless external forces; it comes also from the fact that I collaborate with these forces, giving assent to the very thing that is crushing my spirit. With this realization comes anger, and in anger is the energy that drives some people to say: "Enough. My feet are tired. Here I sit."

These people have seized the personal insight from which all movements begin: No punishment can possibly be more severe than the punishment that comes from conspiring in the denial of one's own integrity.

Corporate Support

But the personal decision to stop leading a divided life is a frail reed. All around us, dividedness is presented as the sensible, even responsible, way to live. So the second stage in a movement happens when people who have been making these decisions start to discover each other and enter into relations of mutual encouragement and support. These groups, which are characteristic of every movement I know about, perform the crucial function of helping the Rosa Parks of the world know that even though they are out of step, they are not crazy. Together we learn that behaving normally is sometimes nuts but seeking integrity is always sane.

Often, when I offer a workshop on the reform of teaching and learning, a professor will come to me privately and say: "I agree with you about these things — but I am the only one on this campus who feels that way." Later in the day, two or three more faculty will take me aside and say the same thing. By evening I have spoken to eight or ten people who are committed to good teaching but are quite sure they are alone in these convictions on their campus.

While stage one is strong on many campuses, stage two is less well developed. Faculty who have decided to live "divided no more" are often unaware of each other's existence — so weak are the communal structures of the academy, and so diffident are intellectuals about sharing "private" matters. It is difficult for faculty to seek each other out for mutual support. But it is clear from all great movements that mutual support is vital if the inner decision is to be sustained — and if the movement is to take its next crucial steps toward gathering power.

Where support groups do exist, they assume a simple form and function. Six or eight faculty from a variety of departments agree to meet on a regular but manageable schedule (say, once every two weeks) simply to talk about teaching. (The mix of departments is important because of the political vulnerability faculty often feel within their own guild halls.) They talk about what they teach, how they teach, what works and what doesn't, and — most important of all — the joys and pains of being a teacher. The conversations are informal, confidential and, above all, candid. When you ask these people how they manage to add one more meeting to their crowded schedules, the answer often is: "This kind of meeting is not a burden, but a relief. It actually seems to free up my time."

Some of these groups have evolved ground rules for conversation, and — on the evidence of other movements — such rules are vital if these groups are to flourish. Rules may be especially vital in the academy, where real conversation is often thwarted by a culture that invites posturing, intimidation, and keeping score. Ground rules cannot create new attitudes, but they can encourage new behavior.

For example, the ground rules may say that each person gets an opportunity to speak — but when the others respond, they may respond only with questions that will help the speaker clarify his or her inner truth. They may not criticize, give advice, offer pity, or say "tsk, tsk" when it turns out one has not read the latest book. The questions-only rule encourages real listening by banning one-upping, amateur psychoanalysis, quick "fixes," and all the other ways we have of walling ourselves off from each other. Of course, people are always free to ask for help with the problems they face. But problem solving is not the primary purpose of these gatherings. Their purpose is to wrap the individual's inner decision in a resolve that can only come from being heard by a supportive community.

"As support groups develop, individuals learn to translate their private concerns into public issues, and they grow in their ability to give voice to these issues in public and compelling ways."

At the moment, I suspect, more women than men are coming together on campus in support groups of this sort. The reason, I think, is simple: Women who care about teaching are involved in two movements at once — one in support of teaching, another in support of women in the academy — so they have double need of communal sustenance. Perhaps they have heard and heeded the admonition of Margaret Mead: "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it's the only thing that ever has."

Going Public

The third stage of a movement has already been implied. As support groups develop, individuals learn to translate their private concerns into public issues, and they grow in their ability to give voice to these issues in public and compelling ways. To put it more precisely, support groups help people discover that their problems are not "private" at all, but have been occasioned by public conditions and therefore require public remedies.

This has been the story of the women's movement (and of the black liberation movement as well). For a long time, women were "kept in their place" partly by a psychology that relegated the pain women felt to the private realm — grist for the therapeutic mill.

But when women came together and began discovering the prevalence of their pain, they also began discerning its public roots. Then they moved from Freud to feminism.

The translation of private pain into public issues that occurs in support groups goes far beyond the analysis of issues; it also empowers people to take those issues into public places. It was in small groups (notably, in churches) that blacks were empowered to take their protest to the larger community — in songs and sermons and speeches, in pickets and in marches, in open letters and essays and books. Group support encourages people to risk the public exposure of insights that had earlier seemed far too fragile for that rough-and-tumble realm.

I am using the word "public" here in a way that is more classical than contemporary. The public realm I have in mind is not the realm of politics, which would return us to the manipulation of organizational power. Instead, to "go public" is to enter one's convictions into the mix of communal discourse. It is to project one's ideas so that others can hear them, respond to them, and be influenced by them — and so that one's ideas can be tested and refined in the public crucible. The public, understood as a vehicle of discourse, is prepolitical. It is that primitive process of communal conversation, conflict, and consensus on which the health of institutionalized power depends.

Many would argue, of course, that our public process is itself in poor health and cannot be relied on for remedies. These critics claim that there is no longer a public forum for a movement to employ. But historically, it is precisely the energy of movements that has renewed the public realm; movements have the capacity to create the very public they depend on. However moribund the public may be, it is reinvigorated when people learn how to articulate their concerns in ways that allow — indeed, compel — a wider public to listen and respond.

Today, educational reform is becoming a focus of public discourse, and will become an even sharper focus if the movement grows. Many books have been written on the subject, and some — for better or for worse — have become best-sellers. Speakers roam the land planting seeds of change in workshops and convocations. New associations advance the cause of change in national and regional gatherings (and faculty who feel isolated on their own campuses seek them out as desert nomads seek oases). Well-estab-

lished national associations have taken reform as an agendum.

Even more remarkable, the movement for educational reform has been joined by publics far beyond the walls of the academy. Parents, employers, legislators, and columnists are calling for more attention to teaching and learning, and their calls are insistent. Recently, a coalition of major accounting firms used the language of collaborative learning to press the agency that accredits business schools toward the reform of business education. At moments like that, one knows that "going public" can make a difference.

Because this activity does not always have direct political impact, some skeptics may call it "mere words." But this criticism comes from an organizational mentality. By giving public voice to alternative values we can create something more fundamental than political change. We can create cultural change. When we secure a place in public discourse for ideas and images like "collaborative learning," we are following those reformers who minted phrases like "affirmative action" and made them the coin of the realm. When the language of change becomes available in the common culture, people are better able to name their yearnings for change, to explore them with others, to claim membership in a great movement — and to overcome the disabling effects of feeling isolated and half-mad.

Alternative Rewards

As a movement passes through the first three stages, it develops ways of rewarding people for sustaining the movement itself. In part, these rewards are simply integral to the nature of each stage; they are the rewards that come from living one's values, from belonging to a community, from finding a public voice. But in stage four, a more systematic pattern of alternative rewards emerges, and with it comes the capacity to challenge the dominance of existing organizations.

The power of organizations depends on their ability to reward people who abide by their norms — even the people who suffer from those norms. A racist society depends on a majority who are rewarded for keeping the minority "in its place" — and on a minority willing to stay there. But as members of either group discover rewards for alternative behavior, it becomes more difficult for racism to reign. An educational system that ignores human need in favor of a narrow version of professionalism depends on a reward system that keeps both faculty and students in their place.

But as soon as rewards for alternative behavior emerge for either group, it becomes more difficult for reform to be denied its day.

What are the alternative rewards offered by a growing movement? As a movement grows, the meaning one does not find in conventional work is found in the meaning of the movement. As a movement grows, the affirmation one does not receive from organizational colleagues is received from movement friends. As a movement grows, careers that no longer satisfy may be revisioned in forms and images that the movement has inspired. As a movement grows, the paid work one cannot find in conventional organizations may be found in the movement itself.

"... people who decide to live 'divided no more' find the courage to face punishment by realizing that there is no punishment worse than conspiring in a denial of one's own integrity."

Ultimately, as a movement grows, conventional organizations are more and more likely to create spaces where movement-style work can be done. Forty years ago, anyone working openly for "equal opportunity" might have had a hard time getting paid work of any sort. Today, many organizations are required to pay someone to serve as their Equal Employment Opportunity officer. Similarly, black and feminist scholars whose insights have long been unwelcome in the academy are not only employable today, but are often recruited with vigor.

In stage one, people who decide to live "divided no more" find the courage to face punishment by realizing that there is no punishment worse than conspiring in a denial of one's own integrity. That axiom, inverted, shows how alternative rewards can create cracks in the conventional reward system and then grow in the cracks: People start realizing there is no reward greater than living in a way that honors one's own integrity. Taken together, the two axioms trace a powerful vector of a movement's growth — from rejecting conventional punishments to embracing alternative rewards.

These alternative rewards may seem frail and vulnerable when compared to the raises and promotions organizations are able to bestow on their loyalists. So they are. Integrity, as the cynics say, does not put bread on the table. But people who are drawn into a movement generally find that stockpiling bread is not the main issue for them. They have the bread they need and, given that, they learn the wisdom of another saying: "People do not live on bread alone." We live, ultimately, on our integrity.

As we explore this fourth stage, where movements return to intersect with organizations, it is important to recall that a healthy

society is one in which organizations and movements are related symbolically — as the case of black and feminist scholars will show. Without movements, such scholars would not be bringing new life to organizations; without organizations, such scholars would not have found ways to sustain careers.

But now that black and feminist scholars have found an academic niche, the need for the movement is not gone. Organizations often employ critics in order to contain them. By placing these scholars in air-tight departments, the academy may yet be able to keep them from breathing new life into the places where education is oxygen-starved. Indeed, the academic culture often inhibits black and feminist scholars themselves from teaching in ways that honor their own insights. The movement has succeeded, but the movement is still needed.

Of course, the educational reform movement is not fulfilled when the academy grants a toehold to nontraditional scholars, any more than the black liberation movement is fulfilled by a society that "allows" blacks to make a life on its margins. The movement will persist until the obvious is acknowledged: Teaching has as much right to full status in the academy as any other academic function — research, athletics, administration, lobbying, fundraising — and it may have even more right than some! Teaching simply *belongs* in the academy, and there is no need to defend that claim.

The defense, if any, must come from those who have promoted a concept of higher education so bizarre that it can ignore the question of how and why we teach and learn. We are at a moment in the history of education when the emptiness of that concept is clear — a moment when real progress on reform is possible. There is much to be done that I have not named here, from revisioning teaching as a legitimate form of scholarship (building on the superb work of the Carnegie Foundation) to developing more sophisticated strategies for change. But in the midst of those complexities, we must remember that all great movements start simply: A few people feel the pain of the divided life and resolve to live it no more. In that resolve is the power to live our moment to its full potential.

Postscript

Though the stages I have sketched here have historical warrant, they obviously comprise an "ideal type," a schematic version of

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how movements happen that is smoother and more hopeful in the writing than in the living. Movements offer no guarantees of success. But neither do organizations, nor life itself. What movements *do* offer is a creative channel for energies that might otherwise be extinguished. They offer us an alternative to the despairing cynicism that is the constant snare of contemporary professional life.

Different people will find themselves at different stages of a movement. Some will want to make a decision against dividedness, some will need to join with others for support, some will have to learn how to "go public," and some will try to find alternative rewards. Every stage has a contribution to make — not only to the cause, but to the person.

At every stage of a movement there is both power to help change happen and encouragement for disheartened souls. Wherever we are on this journey, a step taken to renew our spirits may turn out to be a step toward educational renewal — once we understand the movement way.

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THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL AS TRANSGRESSOR?

Addressing the Disconnection between Expert and Civil Culture

By William M. Sullivan

The oddity of this topic lies not so much in what is stated as in the context, a social as well as intellectual context, which gives it intelligibility. The question I wish to address is why the notion of the "public intellectual," a theme which Russell Jacoby and, most recently, Robert Boynton, have brought to our attention, seems nearly oxymoronic to many, why it seems to go against expectations, to transgress the usual use of language in the late twentieth-century American culture.[1]

"Public intellectual," as both Jacoby and Boynton argue, is in one sense redundant. The very idea of an intellectual once connoted, from its origins in the Enlightenment, a learned concern for the "republic of letters" as a major part of a public dialogue concerned with the shaping of public opinion. It is only relatively recently that "intellectual" has come to be applied to activities focused on the more restricted circles of technically, usually academically, proficient experts.

Perhaps the best place to begin is by following Kenneth Burke in trying to gain "perspective by incongruity." Consider this judgment by Cicero, a source which also serves as a needed reminder that the so-called "Western tradition" does not speak in a simplistic, monotonic voice. We should, writes Cicero, beware of taking the conception of the philosopher put forward by Plato in his *Republic* as a sufficient characterization of the social responsibilities which learning imposes. "For he (Plato) said that they (philosophers) are immersed in the investigation of the truth and that, disdaining the very things for which most people vigorously strive and even fight one another to the death, they count them as

nothing. Because of this he calls them just." However, Cicero argues: "They observe one type of justice, indeed, that they should harm no one else by inflicting injury, *but they fall into another;* for hindered by their devotion to learning, they abandon those whom they should protect.[2]

Developing and generalizing the point, Cicero continues with the observation that, "there are also some who … claim to be attending to their own business, and appear to do no one any justice." But, again, in parallel to his criticism of the apparently blameless "ivory tower" of Plato's philosophers, Cicero asserts that, "though they are free from one type of injustice, they run into another: such people abandon the fellowship of life, because they contribute to it nothing of their devotion, nothing of their effort, nothing of their means."[3]

Cicero was speaking for a conception of civic humanism. According to this view, cities exist to realize the good life. An important way in which cities realize this aim is by providing their citizens with opportunities to develop their abilities and be recognized and rewarded for this. But the civic vision goes on to insist that this individual opportunity, the dignity of the individual which would in later development become the idea of individual human rights, can exist only as it is supported by the cooperation of others. This *interdependence*, the life of the whole civic community, which Cicero calls the "fellowship of life," is the soil, we might say the "ecology," in which individuals can flourish. Recognition of the reality of this interdependence and of the claims this common life must make on the individuals was called by the ancients civic virtue. It is what we might term responsibility.



There is an eerie timeliness to Cicero's critique of the idea that pursuit of knowledge absolves individuals or institutions from wrestling with the public obligations that pursuit places on them. Consider Daniel Yanklelovich's recent analysis of public opinion data which shows a disturbingly wide "disconnect" between the views of American knowledge "elites" and experts, on the one hand, and the larger public, on the other.[4] As Yanklelovich reports it, expert opinion tends to regard social problems as technical mat-

ters to be addressed largely by technical means, and the elites of government, business, communications, education, the arts, and sciences only reluctantly engage in the kind of public discussion that matters most to Americans, discussion which considers the moral as well as the informational aspects of social issues.

For this reason, Yankelovich finds, experts tend to think the public ignorant, seeking always to provide more facts, while the public generally thinks of the experts as morally insensitive and arrogant for apparently refusing to engage the concerns that the public holds most dear. This lack of common understanding fuels the widespread conception of experts, including university faculty, as mere technicians of knowledge, and self-interested ones at that, who lack moral bearings. The effect is to contribute to a spreading skepticism about the claims of experts to speak for or about the public interest, and even to deligitimate the claims of expert knowledge and its supporting institutions, especially the university.

What is the source of this unfortunate "disconnect" between our most advanced institutions for generating knowledge and the democratic public? The expert culture Yankelovich describes has been formed by a number of sources, but its most important institutional source has been the modern university centered on scientific research. The university is the one institution shared by all of the nation's elites, indeed by all members of the professions. It is literally that *alma mater* of modern expertise. Especially since World War II, the greatest expansion of the universities' influence on American life has reinforced the idea that expertise means the ability to apply scientific knowledge to the tasks and problems of life.

The great historic achievement of the natural sciences has been to separate, in the business of investigation, considerations of fact from hopes and wishes, concentrating on the tracing lines of cause and effect. The result has been the enormous expansion of human knowledge of nature through ever-greater specialization of method, with a consequently increased ability to direct natural processes from human aims. As scientific approaches to phenomena have increased the range of technical effectiveness, the prestige of those approaches has encouraged the spread of idealized models of natural scientific research into the traditional fields of the humanities as well as social investigation.

Among the results have been the well-known conflicts over the "two cultures" delineated by C. P. Snow. Technical knowledge

has come to dominate the culture of the university, as well as that of most professions. Something of the broader concerns about education suited to provide an orientation to life as a citizen has persisted in the liberal arts colleges. The idea that research and scholarship could and ought to find part of their meaning in the concerns of the public world has also remained alive in certain places. However, the idea that research, learning, and scholarship carry responsibilities toward the larger world, the "fellowship of life" invoked by Cicero, has been eclipsed within university culture by the insularity of the culture of specialized expertise.

A significant cause of this narrowing has been the very success of the university during the post-World War II era, especially in two roles. The university served as an engine of technological advance, which sped spectacular economic growth, while it also trained a national meritocratic elite, significantly contributing to upward social mobility. Both roles were heavily supported by government and big business. It was during this period that universities and, for the first time in American life, significant numbers of their faculties, became important sources of expert counsel at many levels of American society. Experts, in this model, "solved problems" by bringing the latest technical knowledge to bear on matters which, it has been widely presumed, the public as a whole was too limited to understand, much less address. This was, then, also the era of public relations, advertising, and the national security state.

The kind of elite developed through the university system during those decades was significantly different from the old elites of inherited wealth and social influence. These men and, increasingly, women, learned through their education that what counted was the acquisition of personal skills, above all cognitive capacities, and knowledge. In their own eyes self-made, the new elites felt little sense of *noblesse oblige*, and thought of their responsibilities to American society in terms of deploying their skills rather than seeking to shape opinion toward the public interest.

This was a system well suited to an era of dynamic social stability in which the major institutions worked well and seemed to complement rather than undercut each other, the time of American "consensus" in which large-scale public debate over fundamentals was regarded as unseemly or a sign of political weakness in the face of enemies abroad. The current situation could hardly

be more different. Since the late 1960s, American society has undergone a succession of wrenching changes which have challenged almost every part of that once-confident postwar order. The U.S. is caught up in technological and economic changes, global in scale, which have left the American social fabric significantly weakened. Many if not most of the nation's key institutions no longer seem to function well.

This is the context that gives urgency to the reinvention of a "public" orientation to intellectual life within higher education. The great pressing problems which are beginning to define the new century are not matters to be handled by applying a "technical fix" here and another there. They require a more direct engagement with moral and social dimensions of nearly all aspects of national life. For this situation, which demands new definition, analysis, and evaluation of issues and problems, our meritocratic elites are poorly prepared. Little wonder that they, and increasingly the institutions from which they have sprung, find themselves in something of a crisis of legitimacy.

The kind of expertise which is now most needed is civic rather than technical in orientation. This sort of expert contributes to the civic purpose not by circumventing the public through the imposition of technical devices, but by engaging with broader publics, attempting to make sense of what is happening, analyzing the working of our complex systems with reference to values and principles, listening, arguing, persuading, and being persuaded.



If the model for the technocratic university was that of "applied research," the present calls for something more like active partnership and shared responsibility in addressing problems whose moral and public dimensions are openly acknowledged. In order to provide this kind of expertise, and to exert the appropriate kind of leadership, the unquestioned dominance of the applied research model within the university must be opened to question and reform. Reshaping institutional structures so long in place, and so relatively successful, will require sustained effort and great resourcefulness. The final form of its shape has perhaps begun to emerge from the various efforts at civic engagement already under way.

Is there much likelihood that such an enterprise can succeed? Fortunately, there are suggestions that Americans are modestly hopeful about addressing the major problems which confront us. Daniel Yankelovich reports that public opinion continues to show a widespread desire to "reconcile new social mores with America's core values," especially "a sense of community, neighborliness, hope, optimism, and individual responsibility."[5] The question for the higher education world is whether it has the ability and the will to respond through leadership, institutional design, teaching, and research, in creating a new form of intellectual life for the public good.

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[3] *Ibid.* p. 12.

[4] Daniel Yankelovich, *Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World* (Syracuse University Press, 1991).

[5] Daniel Yankelovich, "Three Destructive Trends: Can They Be Reversed?" Speech to National Civic League's 100th National Conference, Philadelphia, Pa., November 11, 1994, p.15.

PUBLIC SCHOLARSHIP

An Interview with Jay Rosen

In the 1995 issue of the *Higher Education Exchange* we printed an essay by NYU journalism professor Jay Rosen. In that piece Rosen wrote about pursuing a "public identity" as a scholar. *HEX* Editor David Brown recently spoke to Rosen, following up on that first essay. The transcript of that conversation about Rosen's ideas on public scholarship follow.

Brown: *Where do you begin in your own approach to the idea of public scholars?*

Rosen: For me a good starting place is the famous exchange in the 1920s between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey on the nature of the modern public.

Lippmann, you'll recall, doubted that any good could come from our having high expectations of the public, which he saw as overwhelmed by complexity, prone to stereotypical thinking, unwilling to put much time or effort into public affairs, and basically ill suited for the job of citizen in a self-governing society. His recommendation was that we scale back our hopes for what publics could achieve, and place our faith instead in scientific expertise, neutral data, policy advice from a nonpartisan elite who would "know the facts." The public could say yes or no, it could vote the governing party up or down. Beyond that, decision making would have to become the job of insiders and experts.

The interesting thing, however, is that Lippmann saw himself as a chastened but still faithful democrat. In his mind, he was trying to save democracy from a failed romance with what he called the image of the "omnicompetent citizen." Toward "government by the people, of the people" he took an ironic view: that's the rhetoric, he said, but the reality is far different. We have to live in a world where the citizen is manipulated by images and overwhelmed by events. But we can still have a democratic society, Lippmann argued, as long as we keep this irony in mind and find other routes to making most decisions.

Brown: *What is the reply to Lippmann?*

Rosen: Well, there are many ways of countering his view. Perhaps the simplest is to read Lippmann's *Public Opinion*, written in 1922, against David Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest*, which describes how the elite who "knew the facts" blundered blindly into Vietnam. Then go back and read John Dewey's reply to Lippmann in the 1920s. Dewey said: right problem, wrong solution. The public *was* in trouble, Dewey thought, because we have yet to create the kind of environment in which it might emerge as competent to understand and choose.

This emergence into itself — the public coming into its own, as it were — was the image Dewey upheld as a counter to Lippmann's skepticism. Yes, people feel overwhelmed, yes, they are victimized by propaganda playing on their emotions, yes, publics are not doing their job, because we have yet to face the cultural challenge hidden in democracy's political experiment: how to create a culture of public "intelligence" — a key term for Dewey — that gives everyone a shot at understanding their world well enough to remake it. To be a democrat was to have faith that people wanted this opportunity, and would know what to do with it, if given the chance.



Here, according to Dewey, was the real problem: not the limitations of the public mind, but the impoverishment of the climate in which that mind emerged. Dewey refused to see those degradations as inevitable, which is another way of saying that he believed in the promise of public culture, public education, public politics, public deliberation. He believed in public life, broadly defined. In this, of course, he looked for inspiration to Jefferson, the dreamer of a democratic culture, rather than Madison the system-maker.

We might say, then, that Lippmann took the route of democratic irony. The omnicompetent citizen is a joke, he said, but we can still defend a more modest version of "government by the people." Dewey chose the path of democratic hope: if we can just learn how to create the right conditions, the public (we hope) will emerge, as it must if democracy itself is not to become a joke. These are incompatible visions.

Brown: *Why are they incompatible?*

Rosen: Because they lead down different roads. Once you start down the path of democratic irony it takes tremendous discipline to avoid treating the public with contempt and seeing expertise as the answer. Pretty soon you're blundering into Vietnam, white paper in hand. Or, to take a current example, you've devised a "plan" to solve the health care problem — assembled by experts — which you're going to "sell" to the American people. President Clinton became a democratic ironist at the moment he decided to solve the problem himself, then sell the solution to us.

Brown: *Ultimately the sales job failed?*

Rosen: Of course it failed. Why? Because there was not enough public intelligence about health care in the culture-at-large. Or as Daniel Yankelovich would put it, we hadn't moved far enough in our journey from reflexive opinion to the public judgment. We hadn't deliberated, and so we couldn't choose. Clinton thought he could get by with professional expertise, on the one hand, and a public relations strategy on the other. This is the classic Lippmann view. But the result was a colossal failure: health care reform was in ruins when the episode was over.

What's fascinating to me is that we are now able to contest Lippmann on his chosen ground: the ironist's claim to be exhibiting a superior "realism." What's more realistic? Yankelovich's idea that advancing steadily toward public judgment is the only way to solve the problem, or Clinton's P.R. strategy? Where was the realism in Vietnam? Robert McNamara's book is illuminating on that question. So it is now possible to see Dewey's choice — taking our democratic hopes more seriously — as, in fact, a more realistic analysis of how problems get solved in a democratic society that truly wants to remain democratic. And of course, Dewey was the clear victor on the other grounds, like treating others as you would have them treat you. Don't treat the public as a herd, he said. It's bad policy and it's bad for you as a person with democratic pretensions. It will make you cynical and defeatist, if you don't choke on your arrogance first.

Brown: *So how does all this lead to public scholars?*

Rosen: If you believe that Dewey was right and Lippmann was wrong, then you face a kind of existential choice as a scholar with a Ph.D. Or at least let's consider the possibility that we all have this choice, whether we're aware of it or not. What do I take to be the place of intellect in a democratic culture? If intellect takes its proper form as expertise, then that's one kind of "state of affairs"

that ought to prevail; if our aim is a democratic culture where things are intelligently ordered and where everyone has the chance to improve on his or her gifts; or, to put it another way, if the public mind is something we all have to make and improve — rather than fear and manipulate — then this suggests a different kind of life. Public scholarship, from this angle, is what the "life of the mind" would have to become if Dewey turns out to be right.

Brown: *David Mathews says its important to "realign professional practice with democratic imperatives." Does this speak to what you're getting at?*

Rosen: Mathews is wise to question the regime of professionalism. Is the professional the one who "knows" in place of a public that can never really know, as Lippmann would say? Or is the professional the full-time inhabitant of a world that everyone ought to inhabit part-time as a citizen trying to make sense of problems and choices? Mathews likes to say that deliberation is something American elites understand very well because they practice it themselves. Then, in the name of realism, they deny that citizens have the ability or motivation to deliberate. They're keeping it in the family, so to speak. Mathews says to them: Hey, this is public property, not your private preserve.

If we as professionals assume that a deliberative public is a democratic imperative, as Dewey would, and also a political imperative, as Yankelovich argues, then maybe we're obliged to act on this belief. "How can we practice our profession in a way that increases the opportunities for publics to deliberate?" is a very different question from "How can we deliberate as professionals so that we discover, among ourselves, the solution to public problems?" The professionalization of the intellect is not necessarily fatal to the democratization of intelligence, Dewey would say. But professional practice needs to be aimed at the right problems, or the professional mind will profit only at the expense of the public.

Brown: *How would this realignment work in different fields of inquiry?*

Rosen: Well, I don't know, that's something to be discovered by a wider group. But I can tell you about an idea I once had. Journalists on local newspapers often come from somewhere else to report on the problems of, say, Macon, Georgia. They stay a few years, then they leave for bigger papers in Atlanta or Miami. As a result, they are frequently ignorant of local culture and local histo-

ry. Imagine if, during their first week on the job, they were asked to read and absorb a concise history of the town, produced for the newspaper by historians working in concert with editors of the paper. Imagine that this history existed in a fuller, more detailed version, with a subject index keyed to topics frequently in dispute in local politics. Journalists in Macon would then have available to them, on-line, a history they could consult and quote when telling the story of the community in today's news. As professionals, they could enter into the community's story with some appreciation for its earlier chapters.

Now imagine that this history is deposited also in public libraries, available to all newcomers, sort of like an intellectual welcome wagon. Citizens can make use of it when they involve themselves in local politics, as can civic leaders and politicians. The difference between a town that has this resource available and a town that doesn't is what I meant earlier by an intelligent "state of affairs." The public culture is designed so that everyone has the opportunity to become grounded in local history, which is useful if they want to deliberate about choices today.



Should professional historians care if such a public culture exists? Well, if they've aligned their professional practices with the "imperative" of public deliberation, then they would care. But if they think of themselves as the "experts" in local history, available to tell the public what its own history is, then they are unlikely to seek the necessary alliances with editors and librarians and funders. They'll just wait to be asked to lecture at the local library, and they'll call this "community service."

Incidentally, two years ago I pitched this very idea to Sheldon Hackney and some of his staff at the National Endowment for the Humanities. They got very excited at the time and said they would follow up. Then I never heard another word. I say this not to chide Hackney, who had enormous burdens to bear in heading off the destruction of his agency, but only to point to the existential choice I mentioned earlier. Finding the money and institutional support and beginning to experiment with a group of journalists, librarians, and historians — that would have been public scholarship. I felt I had too many other duties, so I let the idea die.

What Dewey could see is that the public was dying a thou-

sand deaths like this every day. That's why he called the public "inchoate," unformed, potentially real but as yet unrealized. Through the power of his imagination — which was democratic through and through — he grasped that a competent public was not so much impractical as *unpracticed*. This is the heart of his reply to Lippmann.

That's why I say Mathews is right when he asks for a realignment in the professions. Public practices are different from professional practices, although professionals can learn to be "more public" in their approach. We might define public scholars as those who are learning or willing to learn this other kind of work.

Brown: *What are some other ways to define the public work of scholars?*

Rosen: One that I've used is: the quest to know things that can only be known with others in the public arena. This definition appealed to me from my work with journalists in creating what is now called "public journalism."

Brown: *Explain for the uninitiated what public journalism is.*

Rosen: Journalists for a long time have been drifting away from democratic hopes toward a more ironic public stance. As the press has become more and more professionalized, it has failed to ask itself how it can help create a deliberative public. Rather, journalists tend to see themselves as "informing" whomever happens to be present on the receiving end of the mass communication channel.

But now people feel themselves adrift in a sea of information, and what they want is some help in making sense of things. This is different than asking journalists to make sense of the world for us. Improving our common sense — what we can know and understand together — is a public challenge; providing us with better information is a professional task. Both are important, but one without the other produces a distorted practice — poorly aligned, as Mathews might say.

As the distance between journalists and their publics has widened, the press has begun to identify more with the politicians and professionals who do politics for us, or aim images at us. Political reporting has become obsessed with what David Reisman in the *Lonely Crowd* called the "inside dopester" mentality. It tries to demystify what the professionals do, so we can see how we're being manipulated. But how does this help us make sense of things and come to decisions as a public? Increasingly it doesn't. We just

become more cynical about politics, and we want nothing to do with it.

So by aligning itself with the professionals who package and sell politics, journalism has lost touch with its democratic charter. It imagines that the most important thing it can do is disillusion us about the way politics really works. This was precisely Lippmann's aim. The ironic turn in journalism has, on the whole, been a disaster. It was probably necessary as a corrective to a journalism that was too cozy with political power in the 1950s and early 1960s. But it has since become an end in itself, a culture that reinforces its own cynicism as it looks out upon a country that, for example, wants everything and refuses to pay for it.

The view of the public as ill informed and immature, lapping up "sound bite politics" with the same enthusiasm it shows for tabloid television, is a powerful professional fiction. It holds the professional culture in place by shutting down the only escape route from the cage of irony — which is democratic hope.

I have to add here that "hope" is not the same thing as "optimism." Christopher Lasch leans on this distinction in the *True and Only Heaven*. Optimism is the sunny belief that things will get better because "tomorrow's another day" and we're advancing toward enlightenment. Lasch calls this the ideology of progress which refuses to grapple with limits on anything. Hope is asserted in the face of limits, but not as a denial of them. You have hope because you trust in what people are capable of, despite their limitations and flaws. In a key move, Lasch associates hope with a sense of "wonder." Lippmann seized on the limits of the public mind, but he forgot to wonder what people were capable of. Democratic hopes are convictions that survive the encounter with democracy's limits. Irony dissolves those convictions, and it has done so in journalism.

Brown: *So how do you get from that conclusion to a public journalism movement?*

Rosen: Public journalism began as a conversation among a small number of journalists who had reached the end of their rope, and were searching for something new. In a sense they wanted an escape from the cage of irony. Many of them were newspaper editors in local communities who had arrived at a simple but devastating discovery: you could publish a wonderful six-part series on a serious public problem and … nothing would happen! Silence would be the result.

How do you explain this? After all, the information was there. But evidently a public requires more than that. As soon as we got journalists interested in what the "something more" was, we were on our way. Of course, the editors had already sent themselves in this direction by trying to do things, through the newspaper, that helped people form themselves into a public. Maybe they held a few forums, or gathered a group of citizens together to discuss the future of the city, or asked themselves how to motivate citizens to participate in public life, or realigned their reporting agencies with the citizens' concerns, rather than professionals and their machinations.

Public journalism became what a group of us discovered it was as we began interrogating these practices with ideas drawn from Dewey's side of the stream. Like, for example, Michael Sandel's wonderful line: "When politics goes well we can know a good in common that we cannot know alone." We began to ask ourselves: suppose we could create a journalism that tried to make politics "go well" in Sandel's sense. What would it look like, sound like, feel like? What would it be saying day-to-day?

"... the answer can only be found by creating a space for reflection and discussion within a profession struggling to find a better public ethic."

That's a question no scholar of the press can answer alone, or in conversation with other academics. On the other hand, journalists aren't likely to encounter a philosopher like Sandel in their daily work. So the answer can only be found by creating a space for reflection and discussion within a profession struggling to find a better public ethic. We started with those who *were* struggling — a tiny minority, of course — and tried to create a space for intellect to work its magic. We had some real-life examples to work from, and the examples fed this idea, while the discussion of the idea inspired further experiments. Pretty soon the idea collided with the professional culture of journalism, which was out of alignment, as I suggested. Now we had a debate within the culture of the press.

Brown: *This is a dangerous moment, isn't it? Ideas like this are easily misunderstood by those not familiar with the thinking, or in opposition.*

Rosen: Absolutely, and we had all the predictable charges thrown at us: You're turning journalists into advocates; you're abandoning the ethic of objectivity in the profession; you want journalism to become a social welfare agency; you're a fad, a gimmick, the latest panacea; or alternately, this is nothing new, we've always done this, and so on.

All we had said was: if publics don't emerge, journalism has no one to inform. Therefore, journalists should do what they can to help people form themselves into a public that might get some work done. How can the press accomplish this? Actually, we didn't know, but we had these experiments to point to, so we said: "maybe it's something like this." Then we started writing manifestos and experimenting with a vocabulary. It soon became clear that public journalism had to be "public" in its execution as well as its content.

Brown: *I'm not sure what you mean by that.*

Rosen: What I earlier called a space for intellect within journalism, where the existing ethic could be challenged and redrawn, had to be seen as a "public" space. Journalism had to change and grow, but the changing and growing ought to happen *in public* — through a process of public debate, public learning, public experiment and revision.

Brown: *Why is that so important?*

Rosen: Because journalists and scholars learn about public life by leading public lives. They come to deliberate across their own divides, and they pick up a lesson in the value of public deliberation across public divides. They do for themselves what they are hoping others can do in the wider community.

Dewey was the one who said that the only cure for the problems of democracy was more democracy. He did not mean: let's vote on everything because the public is always beneficient and wise. He was not being naive. What he meant, I think, is that you can't find the solution to the problems of democracy by starting down an undemocratic path. You may hope to return at a later date to allow people to seize on whatever "solution" you've found, but you won't find a public waiting for you. You'll be met with silence and inaction, or an angry populace asking why it wasn't consulted.

In our case this meant that public journalism — to be true to itself — had to be enacted in public, so that everyone could see what it was trying to become. We couldn't crystallize the idea in a think tank and "sell" it to a wider audience. We had to draw as many journalists as we could into the discussion, and let the idea grow from what these people did and what the discussion produced.

The trick is how to make the discussion "productive" in Sandel's sense: so that we could begin to know a journalism in

common that we could not know alone. Eventually I began to reflect on this method — which was half-conscious, the result of trial-and-error — and it seemed to me that there was something inherently "public" about trying to know things this way. Thus, the idea of "public scholars." Of course, this is only one person's experience, and one way of understanding the term. Others arriving from many other directions will see it quite differently. I'm confident of that.

Brown: *So in your understanding, public scholarship is not the same thing as "popularizing" academic knowledge?*

Rosen: No, and being a public scholar is not the same thing as being a "public intellectual," or a politically engaged intellectual, fighting political battles through a war of ideas. These are different meanings of the term "public," all valid, all important, not necessarily exclusive of each other, but not necessarily supportive, either.

"Public scholars begin with the realization that they* don't *know something, and the something can only be known in one way: through a process of inquiry conducted with others in public."

Brown: *Sort out some of the differences for me.*

Rosen: The popularizer of academic knowledge "knows," but translates what is known for a lay audience. He's the guy lecturing at the public library. Public scholars begin with the realization that they *don't* know something, and the something can only be known in one way: through a process of inquiry conducted with others in public. In the case of public journalism, the unknown was: What are the possibilities for a renewal of journalism's public ethic around the ideals of citizenship and deliberative democracy? The only way to know was to engage journalists in a discussion that was itself engaged with practice.

The difference between this kind of work and the task of the "public intellectual" involves the premise that a public exists, already in conversation with itself. If, out there in the public square, there exists a discussion to which the intellectual can contribute something uniquely valuable, then we want to have the sort of intellectuals who can orient themselves toward that discussion. The ideal of the public intellectual who joins in public debate contrasts with the ancient ideal of *vita contemplativa,* where the life of the mind is lived at some distance from the noise of the public square.

Today, in many ways it is not the "noise" but the silence that is the perplexing fact: the conversations that aren't occurring; the "inchoate" public, as Dewey put it; an undeveloped or perhaps undernourished public sphere. The quest to know things that can only be known with others in the public arena is fundamentally a

quest for that arena; or to put it another way, the task is the social construction of knowledge, an arena for knowing what cannot be known through some other means. As Sandel said, when politics goes well, we can discover something otherwise lost to us.

The ideal of the politically engaged intellectual is altogether different. There the work is created by the urgency of the moment; something is going to be decided. What needs to be said either will get said, or it won't. Those who need to be persuaded will be persuaded, or not. The alliances that need to form may form, or falter. The moment will be won, or it will be lost. This gives us the image of the intellectual as the avante garde, ahead of the times and aware that when the wheel of history turns there is important work to be done.

"... there's something fundamentally open-ended about the inquiry of the public scholar."

The avante garde intellectual "knows" but instead of popularizing knowledge the aim is to politicize people. Public scholarship does have a political dimension to it, but it is quite distant from the politics of the engaged intellectual. As soon as I decide that I *know* what "public journalism" is, and go about recruiting others to my definition, I've crossed over into another line of work. The work may be worth doing — at times it may be an imperative — but it is not public scholarship as I'm using the term.

Brown: *Why not?*

Rosen: Because there's something fundamentally open-ended about the inquiry of the public scholar. Public journalism, for example, is a journey toward a "more public" press. We know the general direction — out of the cage of irony toward a more civic tone — but we really don't know the destination. We don't know what the thing will become. The political work of persuading people and finding partners is there, but what you're persuading them to do is join an "open" inquiry — a public search for a more public press. There's a mutuality to the relationships that's absent in the image of the avante garde, ahead of everyone else.

I constantly discover that the journalists experimenting with public journalism are ahead of me in figuring out what this thing is. On the other hand, I'm often ahead of them in figuring out how to talk about it. But any language I discover that journalists can't use to better their journalism isn't really a discovery at all. So my goal is not to teach them, but to find a productive relationship with them where we're traveling in the same direction. My work must "work" for them and vice versa.

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For example, I'm currently experimenting with a distinction C. Wright Mills used to draw between "troubles" and "issues." Troubles are problems people feel in their daily lives; issues are matters under discussion in the public arena. A journalism that connects troubles to issues, and issues to troubles is obviously what we're after, but public deliberation should do that, too. Is this a useful way of talking about a journalism that would nourish deliberation? I can find out only by testing the language in my relationships with journalists. But in another sense I'm testing the relationships by introducing another language.

Brown: *You've said elsewhere that relationships are what you "do." Could you explain what you mean by that?*

Rosen: The real challenge for me in this work is to avoid the arrogance of the academic who "knows," without condescending to those who don't, or retreating in the face of criticism. That's a problem of defining relationships.

Toward the journalists excited about public journalism, I have to say, "You know your community and your newsroom better than I, and only you can determine the journalism that's worth doing in Wichita. But I have a piece of the puzzle that will let you see your work in a different way. So let's talk." Toward those who are unconvinced I have to say: "Journalism is in trouble if public life falls apart, so it's your future on the line here. You may not like our answers, but you can't pretend there's no problem." To those outside the press who think they're finally going to get a break, it's: "Some journalists are changing, but you have to change the way you relate to the press, as well. The public relations model is part of the problem here, so are you ready to drop it?" Standing in the right relationship to the "others" with whom you're inquiring is the art of public scholarship. I'm learning as I go along, and of course I've made numerous mistakes, just as you do in the classroom in learning a new course.

It's interesting that as public journalism got going and my role in it became known, the profession had to find a name for the relationship I had to the journalists I work with. Often, the first word chosen was "guru," which of course made me blanche. The first big article on the idea in *American Journalism Review* was headlined, "The Gospel of Public Journalism." Along with Davis Merritt, Jr., editor of the *Wichita Eagle*, I was portrayed as an itinerant preacher in revivalist mode. These metaphors, which were

not of our making, were extremely revealing. The image of a "guru" completely erased the mutuality I spoke of. Certainly the journalists involved in the experiment didn't think of themselves as needing or having a "guru." Who would? Similarly, the preaching metaphor cut against the emphasis we tried to place on public conversation. Labeling us "believers" was a subtle way of discounting the power of democratic hope, and so on.

At first we were distressed by these devices, and complained like everyone else who gets press notice; we're being stereotyped! Then we realized; journalism was doing journalism to public journalism. It was exhibiting toward this movement the very framing rituals that help disable public conversation in the wider arena — which of course we were trying to question. The professional culture we were running up against was coming forward to display itself. This was great! It meant that even those who were "against" the idea, or just reporting on it, became caught up in it because the idea was really in the arc it traced across the profession. Public journalism, in my mind, is what happens when journalists and others confront the challenge of making journalism more public.

When Leonard Downie, editor of the *Washington Post*, joined in a debate with me and others about the idea, he made a point of denying that journalists were political actors in any significant sense. Others act; journalists report what these others do. Of course, deciding to frame a new development as a religious revival *is* a kind of "action," at least in my view, and in this sense journalists help create the field of politics for us. Downie's denial of this elementary point, his refusal to see framing as a kind of political act, was important to get on-the-record. Downie was "doing" public journalism, you see, by issuing his denial in a very public forum.

A professional culture always contains strategic blind spots, and if you want to challenge it you have to get the blindness to show itself. The best way to do that is to "go public" with the idea, flush out the culture so that people can see and hear it and ask: Is this really what I believe?

Brown: *If people start writing manifestos about public scholars and public scholarship, aren't they going to run into these same problems of distortion and denial?*

Rosen: Sure, but that's what's "public" about it. You have to make yourself vulnerable to that cycle in order to learn something you can learn in no other way. "What happens when the professional

culture of the American academy is challenged to realign itself with the imperative of democratic deliberation?" would be one way of phrasing the question that public scholarship wants to pose.

To find out what happens you have to do the work: create the arenas where the discussion can happen, find the "others" with whom the discussion can be had, fashion a provisional language you can speak, and locate the examples to speak about. Then we'll see what the thing is. But the work has to be public: a deliberation where possible, a debate where necessary. I can predict this: a host of people will rush forward to explain to us that "public scholarship" is nothing new.

Brown: *And what is the response?*

Rosen: We surrender immediately: "You're right, it isn't new at all. Now can we get on with it?"

* * * * *

I turned over what Jay Rosen said about the work of public scholars:

> *"If the public mind is something we all have to make and improve — rather than fear and manipulate — then this suggests a different kind of life."*

At a minimum, it suggests a different kind of classroom.

Democratic Practice: A Subtext for the Classroom

Last year in the *Exchange* I wrote about the "disconnect" between the institutions of higher education and a public that sees little being done by academics that is civic minded in either their scholarship or their teaching. I quoted the late Ernest Boyer as saying "The campus is seen as a place for faculty to get tenured and students to get credentialed, but what goes on there is not seen as relevant to many of our social problems."

What would be "relevant" is making better use of the classroom as a place where students learn the arts of democratic practice as a subtext in a wide variety of courses covering many different fields of knowledge. How might this be done? I offer my own teaching experience here knowing full well that there are countless other ways to include the arts of democratic practice in a classroom, laboratory, or studio.

My objection to many introductory courses in undergraduate

and graduate education and the textbooks and cases that sustain them is that *too much* is done *for* students and *not enough* is done *by* students. Information and "knowledge" is packaged and conveyed, often with heavy doses of prescriptive advice. The problems that students practice their skills on come ready-made and well defined with enormous amounts of data. Unfortunately, such excessive packaging obscures the trial-and-error process in which most learning is grounded. Such courses and texts are understandably eager to deliver a useful commodity to students, and students are understandably eager to be consumers. The irony is that they are shortchanged.

In most courses, it is better that students learn to make their own observations, assemble their own data, share with each other what each has observed and assembled, and frame and name problems that their collaboration makes possible. This is a far better way to experience learning than to receive someone else's ready-made answers. Students need to learn that asking good questions is a precondition to understanding what makes a good answer and that good questions and answers are usually the products of many minds working together. It also so happens that the work of observation, assembling data, framing questions, and deliberating with others on choosing a course of action is also the work of anyone publicly engaged in addressing the endless problems of a democratic society.

Among the courses that I teach is one devoted to general management with the stated purpose of helping students develop their skills of thinking and acting like managers whether in the public, not-for-profit, or private sectors. I am aware that there is also a subtext in the course which is about how to reason and act with others in a free society. In my classroom I ask students, many of them part-time, to report back to a "sector group" (4-5 students per group) about the "culture" of the organizations in which they are currently employed, and about the relations of "power and dependence" in their organizations. From these individual reports and the commonalties of organizational life that they piece together in their respective sector groups, I construct a composite profile of an organization for each sector group to develop during the balance of the term. The



composite organization is, in part, of their own making and the three problem sets that follow during the term are a consequence of the choices they make as they "manage" their organization throughout the semester.

With five sector groups, five different stories develop — each having its own episodes and outcomes. Such a "layered" case becomes more complex as the term progresses, but I have learned that students can become more adept as they become more familiar with the story that they are asked to manage. The story that evolves from their collaboration has no predetermined outcome. As a teacher, I receive their work, build on it, and give it back to them. They, in turn, address a new problem set, produce a response, and bring it to me. This continued exchange assumes that there be adequate time for reflection. The learning outcome of the kind of classroom teaching that I describe is not a body of knowledge per se but reflective practice — learning to observe, to ask good questions, to structure problems, and to produce answers or fashion outcomes in an ongoing collaboration with others.

As I have written elsewhere, a teacher may "treat any problem that arises from such collaboration as further opportunity for learning. If some students rely on others to do the work for them; if one or two students take over the problem solving by default; if some students claim to know more and ask the other to defer to them; if some students complain that others 'goofed off' and ruined the outcome — all these 'problems' are grist for useful discussions about what you do when they happen. Students should not see these as 'glitches' in an otherwise flawless learning laboratory, but rather as the kind of problems that arise in any real-world collaboration." (*When Strangers Cooperate*, New York: Free Press, 1995, p. 158).

There are many ways to teach. I have sketched one possible way that teachers and students develop their own text together through analysis, interaction, and reflection. In the course I teach, learning outcomes are for would-be managers, but the subtext is developing the deliberate skills needed for participation in a democratic society. It is subtext that any of us can pursue when entering the classroom.

David W. Brown

IN WHOSE FAVOR AM I TEACHING?

by Janice L. Lucas

"Ms. Lucas, I can't get my paper to you like I said I would," Robert said hesitantly. "Can I have an extension?"

It was after 11 a.m. that Sunday morning in March, and I was supposed to be sitting on a pew at Allen Chapel A.M.E. not on my way out of the door. Why couldn't Robert tell this to me after class tomorrow?

Before I could respond to his immediate question, Robert explained that he had been attacked by someone with a crowbar Saturday night and had shot the man. When I heard that a young man had been killed, a teenage father, my heart sank even deeper. Then Robert told me, his English teacher, that he had shot and killed the young man.

At church, I was stupefied for most of the service. I kept thinking about Robert. He called me and asked for a one-day extension on an English essay and less than 18 hours earlier he had killed somebody. Why did he call me?

The Friday before I had asked Robert to stay after class and talk with me about his papers. He was behind on a couple of assignments, yet I knew that it was not because he couldn't do the work. He just needed a little prodding, or so I thought. That was not it at all, for Robert had been wrestling with a much more complicated problem: the father of a baby whose mother was Robert's friend. A family member provided Robert with the answer: a gun.



Robert had provided me with a question: What made him think to call his English teacher? Sure, I give all my students my home phone number and encourage them to call me about their assignments. But what had I said or done to make him call me?

By that time, I had been teaching at the community college six years and had become confident enough

to accept the honor of being called a teacher. In my beginning days of teaching my confidence in being a teacher was about as firm as a newborn calf. At the beginning of 1987, I was a daily reporter at my hometown newspaper. Nine months later I was the journalism instructor at Gulf Coast Community College. Upon leaving the journalism profession, I looked forward to getting involved in my community. Being out of journalism meant that I could join community groups and serve on boards and committees. I could express my opinions on subjects. Still in my twenties, I had come to the conclusion that, for me, a greater difference could be made by being an active worker in the community. *Life is filled with swift transitions.*

What wasn't as swift, however, was my ability to identify myself as a teacher, so I euphemistically corrected those who would call me a teacher by saying, "I facilitate learning." When I made the proclamation to students, I used my most professorial voice while intoning that I could not and would not take responsibility for their learning. For I discovered very quickly that knowing a subject and knowing how to teach what one knows are not the same.

Although the increasing numbers of underprepared students at community colleges may give the impression that community college students have little intellectual capacity, I find quite the opposite. Many community college students have latent intellectual skills. Many students who succeed do so because they determine a practical application for the material. I am encouraged as a teacher when students evolve intellectually through the course of a semester or over several semesters. I also know that awakening the intellect requires fresh teaching each semester. It requires being aware of the students as individuals and myself as teacher.

Some of my assumptions, however, were being challenged and that semester when Robert called to ask for an extension on his English paper brought several clearly into view. Prior to that Sunday morning, during the same semester, a young man in one of my other English classes was shot over a weekend and had to drop out. That semester shattered my assumption that teenage violence was a problem that did not affect my students. Somehow I had assumed, probably because of my own commu-

nity college experience, that the students who came to college would not be involved in violent confrontations. I was naive, but it was an assumption I did not know I had until that spring semester of 1993.

I had been naive but now what was I to do? Certainly, as an English teacher I could encourage students to write about the current trends, both locally and nationally, and about the increasing use of violence to solve problems. I could lecture about the negative consequences of violent behavior. But students needed a way to come to their own conclusions about how to handle anger and violence. So we — my colleagues and I in Student Development — started with "rap sessions," providing a space for students to talk about issues they faced. The first session brought five students who shared information about their lives. The second session brought three times that number. We adults probably learned more about those students than we would have in class, for they were talking among themselves in a public space about private issues.

By this time along my journey toward becoming a teacher, I had begun to practice my own preaching by venturing into the unknown, just as I was encouraging writing students to do. I knew that many of them come to the task of writing with fear and many of them get scared as they uncover themselves in the writing process. Thus, at the age of one-score and ten, despite having been born and raised in a city that borders the Gulf of Mexico, a friend and I encouraged each other in a beginning swim class. That experience challenged my instruction to students to "trust the process," "go below the surface," "stick with it, especially when you feel most lost." The swim class helped me to see anew the difficulty in learning something that I was also scared of doing.

Although I knew intellectually that many students were fearful about writing, about making mistakes, about appearing ignorant, I had no sense of how debilitating such fright could be. During my collegiate experiences, I had encountered tough classes, but had never withdrawn from a course. My understanding of the students' fear of writing was superficial, until I had to learn myself how to breathe, kick, and move in unison. When faced with the serious thoughts of quitting the class after accidentally

doing a somersault into the deep end and choking myself, it was my own "preaching" that forced me to return. How could I continue to instruct students to face their fears if I was not willing to face mine? Thus, I came to know that working with my students included continuing to challenge myself to learn new things.

The swim class also gave me a new understanding of writing students' struggles. I learned what I hoped they would learn: even when the mind and body reject and resist, something in the heart and the soul keeps sending us back for more until one day the light comes on and we know that which we did not know before.

My efforts in teaching are fruitless when students destroy on the weekend what they work all week to create, when they don't have a way of working through issues that affect their private lives. Yes, journal writing is a place to start. When my actions as a teacher caused a student to call me when he's in trouble that has nothing to do with an English paper, I had to think about what I was teaching. Students can give words to the reality, pain or joy of their lives. When that reality is shared, personal relationship begins. Why does a student in trouble call a teacher? Why did Robert call me? Over the past three years I have come to the conclusion that I teach students. With the student as my primary focus, rather than English or literature, I find more possibilities than problems.

In teaching, as in other pursuits, we know that there is a light switch, but in the dark we can't always find it. A class does not share the same switch. Students are individuals, so motivation can't be standardized. I have to get to know the students. Talk with them. Learn about their interests in an effort to encourage their writing, their growth, and their development.

Each semester I tried experiments. I required students to mix in groups, to talk with each other, and to work out problems together. Some students thought I was being lazy or unconcerned about them as individuals. But I know that in the world outside, people have to be able to work together in teams. The classroom should not be an exception. Engaging students in dialogue, encouraging them to take chances, grading them on their efforts, and trying to establish a sense of community while doing so is messy and difficult work, certainly not the choice of a lazy teacher.

But why did I care about these students beyond ENG 1101 or English Literature? Why not just lecture, test, and grade? Perhaps, it was the recognition that as a teacher, I can make a difference. How and what a student learns, commits to heart and head, can be a deciding factor in how he handles success or failure. How can I help these students care more about the use of language, themselves, and each other?



In the beginning, I came to teaching at a community college because my alma mater recruited me. Prior to then, being a community college professor was not a career option that was on the screen. The reason for starting something, however, is not necessarily the same for continuing. In the nine years since beginning this endeavor, I've had to determine why I remain in the field. I'm still figuring it out.

Well, as most of us know, I must stay current in my field, be courteous in my deportment, and carry my weight in my department. I must be a professional but that is not enough. How does my professionalism help students make a distinctive contribution to our community? As former Modern Language Association President Houston Baker noted in his 1992 conference address, "Professionalism is a job; professionalism minimizes risk." Making a distinctive contribution to local and regional publics can be difficult and risky.

As a continuing learner who seeks to make a difference in my community, I must take courageous steps beyond the realm of professionalism. So I experimented with this notion of creating a community within each class. Students ought not sit through 12 weeks together without the opportunity to get to know each other. Before the division required an oral presentation of research papers, I gave students the option of presenting them to the class for extra credit, even reserving a different room for the presentations when possible. When the division required oral presentations, I had every student read his or her paper to the entire class. By beginning on the first day to get to know each other, by the time research paper time came, there was often a sense that they were in a safe place.

How do we promote a learning community?

By being an example through active contributions to the *polis*, in addition to teaching.

By being willing to have experiences that allow us to see from a student's perspective.

By engaging in dialogues.

By creating a community in the classroom where students can explore questions, share experience, and know they are valued as individuals.

As Paulo Freire stated, "Education is politics. In favor of whom am I teaching? Against whom am I teaching?"

THE PUBLIC SCHOLAR WHO NEVER WAS

By James Norment

Earlier editions of the *Exchange* argue that the relationship between the public and the academy is in serious disrepair. I propose that we cannot begin to understand and repair the public/academy relationship until we consider more thoroughly the sort of graduate education scholars provide to graduate students. My aim in this essay is to draw attention to a small but vitally important slice of that relationship: how graduate education neglects the development of what is called in this *Exchange* a "public scholar."

I argue in this article that the process of applying to and matriculating in graduate school lacks an internal integrity that allows admissions committees and applicants to confront the issues of public scholarship. I conclude with a personal observation that should prompt you to ask of yourself, your colleagues, and — perhaps most important — your students: How was I prepared in graduate school to engage with the public? How can professional academics collaborate with graduate students or junior faculty in ways that encourage public problem solving, engagement, and deliberation? Am I willing to admit that universities belong in the public life of my community and that we professors must be willing to be shaped by our public engagement? These are serious questions. In the final analysis, for me at least, they help judge the value of graduate education and the degree of honesty we exercise when we claim a public-civic mission for colleges and universities.



It is not easy for me to turn my back on graduate study in the social sciences. Of the three sorts of graduate education I have seriously considered — theology, law, and political science — the latter always appeared to offer me the most excitement, challenge, and options in choosing how and where I might continue my life's journey.

The powerful and awesome notions of research, teaching, intellectual discovery, and adding value to society have drawn me toward advanced graduate study and an academic career.

Yet graduate programs consistently avoid encouraging applicants and students from considering their future relationship with the public. If applications are designed to assess aptitude, intelligence, and commitment to a particular field, then they should also ask tough questions about how future scholars see their future as responsible members of a democratic society.

Most college catalogs contain a statement similar to this one: Higher education seeks to "nourish habits, understandings, and aspirations essential to a full and satisfying and estimable human life. . . ." Yet these words appear stale, tired, and foreign to many of us who pursue a career in higher education. Instead, we focus almost exclusively on the high-minded notions of research, appropriate methodology, and theory, as well as the day-to-day struggle for funding, to produce top-ranked literature, and departmental parlaying of power and privilege. Some academics suggest graduate students should be trained exclusively in such a marketplace of ideas. It is, after all, the predominate culture of academic life.

I demur. Instead, we should bundle the critical and analytical spirit of intellectual life with a training that is at least as rigorous in pushing graduate students to confront their future as members of the public. University life holds a special position in training for life, a position we can call "civic" or "liberal" education. Colleges and universities do not simply have a civic mission, instead the "university *is* a civic mission".[1] This civic mission is rooted in the creation of a "democracy of words (knowledge) and a democracy of deeds (the democratic state)." College life, therefore, is not one limited to the self-referential world of scholarship, nor is it limited to vocational teaching. These notions might be true of traditional undergraduate education, but they are afforded few corners in many doctoral graduate programs.

I am not suggesting that graduate programs should confer Ph.D.s in the liberal arts instead of degrees symbolizing expertise grounded in original, often highly specialized, research. I am, however, arguing that graduate programs should consider the implications of an educational experience that emphasizes an unhealthy initiation into the realms of departmental politics,

sequestered literature production, and a divorce from the collaborative spirit of liberal education. What good does intellectual discovery do when students are caught in the mire of esoteric and internal preoccupations of, for instance, tenure and methodology? In an age when the disconnected public regularly and seriously advocates major changes in higher education, what good are indecipherable "academic" discussions held not in *conjunction with* but *instead of* public engagement?

We need only a cursory review of any academic journal collection in a university library to see that most academic scholarship is for academics only. This is not news. But what is often forgotten is that the roots of the academic mind-set lie in the graduate training. The socialization process of graduate school reproduces scholars. Thus, if scholars aren't producing public-minded scholarship, it is doubtful that their advanced students will be. The essentially medieval practice of apprenticeship to an expert mentor may — when it works — produce another expert or even a great teacher. However, such a system cannot regularly produce scholars who are interested in and even committed to being engaged with the public.

Such graduate program practices lack an internal integrity when it comes to fostering public scholars. That is, my search for a graduate program has revealed that professors consistently fail to systematically reflect and act on the what is right and what is wrong about their practice of training future teacher-scholars. In my own experience, I have applied, interviewed, and been accepted at a wide range of doctoral programs. During my search, I expected potential professors to resonate with my need to participate in the public life of my new community. Some I interviewed misinterpreted my intentions, indicating that departmental politics should be left to "second or third years." Others were surprised to find such notions in someone who, they thought, should be entering a period of deep isolation from the "real world." Others were more insightful, but brutally honest. They saw no place for such dalliances in public decision making, politics, whatever the circumstance might be, because the stan-



dards of academic integrity and freedom were — once and for all — the overriding concerns of a professional academic. I found one experience especially disorienting. While visiting a large private school in a large university city, I was enthralled with the kind demeanor of the faculty and their concern for theoretical issues surrounding politics and society. Yet I found no evidence that their ideas met action. Indeed, if action did come, one graduate student told me, then it would be clearly subordinated to theory and exercised at your own risk.

Some professional academics might think me somewhat naive for entering the fiercely competitive graduate application process expecting to see the "good" and "civic" side of specialized education. Such an observation, however, misses my point. Instead, my point is that graduate training from the very beginning creates an inconsistency in our logic and avoids essential tensions in personal and public reflection on why graduate students want to become teacher-researchers and what they should do with their privileged positions as scholars. Such reflection is a vital part of graduate education if a start is made to fuse expertise with public purpose. If we cannot agree, then my hopes of deliberating with thoughtful people on how we can each combine our life's work with our community cannot be addressed in advanced graduate training.

My concern, however, moves beyond a graduate student's failure to wrestle with issues of purpose and value beyond the discipline. I see a growing number of potential graduate students, including myself, who are actually driven away from an academic career because graduate programs foreclose early on opportunities to develop a relationship with the public that allows us to be simultaneously part of a discipline yet also shaped by deliberation with others outside the college walls.

For example, in my own chosen field of political science, I have had both passable and excellent courses from a wide range of professors. From the perspective of public engagement, the worst of these professors has openly derided the ability of the public to inform debate, much less worth the trouble to become involved in, either personally or professionally. The best of these professors has struggled with how to become involved. The trouble is that the conscientious professors I know at graduate training schools must

work to overcome their own biases formed in graduate school. In addition, their disciplines stymie efforts to build a deliberative relationship with the public. One of my professors remarked that it is unfortunate, but probably true, that if an entire conference of social scientists were blown up, the public, which academics claim to strengthen, would hardly notice. Novice scholars like myself, who are excited by both the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of a genuine relationship with the public, are not asked to produce public-minded scholarship, participate in public discourse, or explore how the academic realm can contribute to a healthy deliberative public.

I consider myself very fortunate to have found an unusual graduate program in which to begin my advanced academic training. This graduate program offered only a master's degree in government. The faculty hoped to provide a few students the opportunity to explore graduate work without the long-term commitment to a doctoral program while also providing, over one or two years, the grounding necessary for the highest performance in fine Ph.D. programs. Having completed that program, I now know it was a safe haven for determining how I might judge doctoral programs. I am now able to ask, with some disciplinary competence, the usual questions about courses, theories, and placement. More important, though, are the questions I can ask of the scholars with whom I will learn: How serious are you in working to fuse your life's work with your community? How does your graduate training system discourage students from integrating their course work and original research with public concerns, relationships, or information? To ignore questions like these seems a waste for the very few individuals privileged enough to work with their minds and have some influence over the minds of others, not the least of which are students and the public.

I began this essay by saying it was difficult for me to turn my back on graduate work. In reality it appears that the system of graduate education has turned its back on me and my fellow graduate students who search for the richer notion of specialized training and public engagement.

Will the academic status quo prevail or will university "civic learning centers," redirected graduate advisors, and a constant dissatisfaction among graduate students shape the future of

public-scholar training? Ultimately, of course, colleges and universities can successfully enter a public life only with scholars who are not content with the academic status quo. The current socializing orientation of graduate education discourages those students who want to enhance and extend their relationships with the public. If such like-minded graduate students continue to be driven away from academic life, is there any hope or reason to expect public scholars to develop and survive in our colleges and universities?

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ACADEMIC PROFESSIONALISM AND THE NEW PUBLIC MINDEDNESS

By Maria M. Farland

My department at Johns Hopkins University is conducting a job search for an open-rank, interdisciplinary position in the humanities. Because the position is broadly defined, we have received nearly 700 applications, in fields ranging from history of medicine to sociology, from persons as diverse as department chairs at UC Berkeley to insurance adjustors in Florida. The sheer number and diversity of these applications is staggering. To some readers, the plethora of applications is evidence of a stagnant job market. As professional organizations like the Modern Language Association convene special forums on the crisis in the job market, and many educators call for a reduction in graduate programs, job searches in which there are five, six, even seven hundred applicants, are no longer unusual.

But as a reader of these applications, what has impressed me most is the overwhelming number of applicants who stress their interest in the public. For example, one applicant, who is completing a Ph.D. in French history at Columbia, writes: "My commitment to liberal education in public life is evident in my participation in a new group of scholars, Educators for the Public Sector. Our work stresses the importance of the public sphere for educators involved in higher education." He wrote enthusiastically of the group's work in New York City raising awareness about the public in area colleges and universities. Another applicant for the job, a Ph.D. candidate in philosophy, writes of her involvement in convening public forums and emphasizes its relevance and importance to her involvement with the public to her role as scholar and teacher. Viewing her professional scholarship and her role as a citizen as compatible pursuits, this young woman urged the committee to consider the importance of preparing undergraduates for their future roles in public life. Across a wide range of disciplines, young scholars in particular have a renewed interest in

the public mission of both universities and academic scholarship.

The notion that higher education has a civic or public purpose is not a new one. Most college and university mission statements continue to include the goal of preparing their students for "citizenship." Despite the fact that policies and curricular initiatives aimed at fostering civic education are rare, many would agree that it is in college that many young people will learn their most decisive lessons about public life. Young academic professionals seem to have heeded Derek Bok's call that "there are few subjects more important for schools and universities to consider than" how to play a role in "the civic affairs of their country and community."

The view that institutions of higher education have a public purpose has a long history, as historian Thomas Bender has shown. According to Bender, America's earliest institutions of higher learning were viewed as civic and public in character. Even the first American graduate schools were founded to "reform our public life, our civic life, our politics," as Bender argues. The founding committee of the Columbia University graduate school declared their intention to train men for "the duties of public life," believing that intellectual and civic leadership were synonymous. Likewise, John Dewey urged early twentieth-century educators to "bring their knowledge into the public realm," arguing that democracy would only be realized when "inquiry" and the "art of full and moving communication" were brought together.

Earlier generations of academic professionals saw their disciplines as vehicles for participation in public life, a conception of their professional identity that Bender calls "civic professionalism." Gradually, academic professionals grew to see the purpose of their knowledge exclusively in terms of their disciplines and the goal of furthering specialized knowledge, resulting in the "disciplinary professionalism" that dominates today's academic culture. But earlier, community-based conceptions of the role of the intellectual placed academic professionals squarely within the public sphere. As Bender shows, the idea that academic professionals have a public or civic role to play is a venerable one.

"... the idea that academic professionals have a public or civic role to play is a venerable one."

Today's renewed interest in the public involves not only young scholars' views of themselves as professionals, but also the content of their scholarship. In recent years, a number of ground breaking works of scholarship have analyzed the category of the

public from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. In fields like political science, whose interest in the public has so often been reduced to empirical devices like polling, debates about the nature of the public sphere are resurgent. Prominent scholars like Nancy Rosenblum and Iris Marion Young, taking their cue from Jurgen Habermas' ground breaking analysis, have produced important new analyses of the structure and composition of the public sphere. In literature, Michael Warner's important *Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere* discusses the literature of the early American republic, from the Declaration of Independence to Benjamin Franklin's autobiography, in terms of the emergence of the public sphere and contemporary deliberative institutions such as the town meeting. In history, Kenneth Cmiel has shown the gradual waning of the importance of the public, deliberative side of oral and written expression in a variety of academic fields like rhetoric. Examining the history of the teaching of subjects like grammar and oratory in the nineteenth century, Cmiel shows that intellectuals gradually became less concerned with the public, deliberative aspects of rhetoric, as they focused increasingly on the private, individual learner in isolation. Even professional schools, like Princeton's School of Architecture, which recently convened a major academic conference on "Public Spaces," are getting into the act. And with the publication of Bruce Robbins' anthology, *Rethinking the Public Sphere*, scholars debate about the public among themselves, across the disciplines.

What does it mean for space — of a building, a city, an exhibition, or an institution — to be "public"? Over the last decade, interest in this question has also prompted vigorous debate in the fields of art, architecture, and urban studies. Widespread interest in the question of "the public," as one architectural historian puts it, has been inspired by contemporary political events as diverse as "the restructuring of global capitalism, the rise of a new public art industry, the eclipse of Soviet-style regimes, and the rising corporate influence on art." Developments in the public sphere have sparked a new, interdisciplinary consideration of what it means for spaces to be "public" in fields such as geography and architecture

whose primary object of inquiry is space. Invocations of "the public" have been used to support a wide array of theories and critiques not only in the humanities but in professional fields whose practitioners consider themselves engineers.

Among colleagues of mine who have recently completed Ph.D.s, there is overwhelming interest in the public as a topic of scholarship. One young colleague in English has examined the transformation of the role of the public in the arts, focusing on the period of the New Deal and the Federal Arts Project. In response to the economic crisis of the depression, the U.S. government took an active role in supporting the arts, thereby making the role of the artist or writer a more "public" one. Another young scholar makes the emergence of the apartment building at the end of the nineteenth century central to her analysis of the meaning of the term "public," arguing that this new form of housing meant a reconfiguration of the relation between public and private. Combining public and private space, the apartment was a hybrid form whose emergence influenced the way we think about categories such as public and private in the twentieth century. For many young scholars, movements for democratization in Eastern Europe and Latin America have led to a rethinking of how civil society and publics around the world work. One young scholar of ancient Greek has brought these concerns back to the context of Periclean Athens, examining what he calls the "culture of dispute," the rhetoric of public debates in ancient Greece and how they reflect certain notions of what it meant to appear in public and to be a citizen. And finally, feminist scholarship has continued to show how spaces, occupations, and identities often considered private, actually have impact in the public sphere.



Despite the enormous diversity of approaches that characterize the new public mindedness among today's academic professionals, there is ample evidence that "the public" has emerged as a common concern in fields as diverse as urban planning and English literature. Academic professionals who align themselves with a variety of disciplines — history, literary criticism, the social sciences, architecture — share a common interest in the way in which public spaces and cultures have evolved, emerged, and

transformed in a variety of places, times, and societies. Perhaps the new public mindedness marks a kind of new "common ground" where today's academic professionals, despite the predominance of the culture of specialization that Bender labels "disciplinary professionalism," can escape their specific professional affiliations and begin to examine what it means to be "public." That examination brings the opportunity for a resurgence of "civic professionalism." As academic professionals come together to examine the history and nature of the public sphere, they inevitably begin to involve themselves in the issues and problems the public faces.

But even as today's scholars have turned increasingly toward the public as a focus of intellectual debate and inquiry, the public image of their institutions has come under attack. As the decade opened, story after story depicted the shortcomings of higher education, as one *New York Times* article summarized: "the splendid seclusion of the university has been shattered by a barrage of criticism." The Carnegie Foundation warned that "acts of incivility weaken the integrity of many institutions" of higher learning. Stories about higher education's failings appeared on the covers of *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News & World Report*, and were debated on programs like "Firing Line" and "The MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour." The debate over the purpose and function of higher education in American society made higher education the center of a number of larger societal controversies about issues like cultural pluralism, and the university emerged as the focus of noisy and often heated debate about public problems.

Like it or not, the university had gone public, becoming the focal point for a number of questions of broader interest to the public. But by making the university the subject of such debates, the public was also pointing out that America's college and university campuses were themselves spheres of public activity. The public and the media complained that public life itself had broken down at America's college and university campuses, and many scholars seemed to agree that civility had become a problem at their institutions. Prominent scholars like Harvard's Henry Louis Gates urged academic professionals to renew their attention to the public, "to forge, for once, a civic culture that respects both difference and commonalities." The public has looked to universities for solutions to public problems, and had found academic communities to be dysfunctional public spheres. Many became convinced

that higher education was inattentive to public problem solving, from the issues and concerns that shape public life and debate. Even worse, academic professionals seemed unable to address the problems plaguing their own communities.

Many academic professionals, heeding the call to reassert their relevance and to recapture their public function, seemed to respond with a new public mindedness, as I have argued here.

"Academic professionals have made the public a ... category for intellectual analysis and study...."

Much of that new public mindedness, unfortunately, is largely taking place within the disciplines, remaining within the framework of the old "disciplinary" professionalism. Academic professionals have made the public an object of study, examining its history, its relation to other categories, its unending diversity and multiplicity. They have made "the public" a category for intellectual analysis and study, a special topic for academic journals and conferences, an academic buzzword with all the prestige and cache of jargon-ridden theories. Where the public, the news media, even politicians demanded that academic professionals be more responsive to their public function, intellectuals responded by making publicness yet another opportunity for academic business-as-usual. Rather than reexaming their disciplinary or professional affiliations to consider in what sense their work might engage questions and concerns that are public in nature, they have continued in the mode of specialization, bringing the expertise of their disciplines to bear on the abstract category of "the public." At a moment when the public itself is less and less satisfied with what is going on in universities, and more and more convinced that academic scholarship is irrelevent to the problems most people face, the recent academic turn toward the public hardly represents the fundamental rethinking of academic professionalism that the occasion seems to demand. As their profession suffers from what might be called a severe crisis of legitimacy, most academics are continuing to operate according to assumptions about their own professional identity that seem increasingly inadequate. Ironically, the academic turn toward the public has taken precisely the form of the hyper-specialized, disciplinary mode of inquiry that first disconnected academic professionals from their public mission. Even as the public recaptures attention in current intellectual debates, intellectuals remain largely disconnected from the very public which captivates them, insulated within the specialized languages and frameworks of their disciplinary knowledge.

If the new public mindedness is to be anything more than an academic fad, and if intellectuals are to resecure their legitimacy in the eyes of the public on whose support they will continue to depend, their turn toward the public must involve a more fundamental rethinking of their professional orientation. Recognizing that the institutions that organize intellectual and cultural life in the United States have origins that are civic and public in character, they must redirect themselves away from rarefied, specialized segments of society toward the broader public realm. As recent debates about higher education have demonstrated, the public sphere is a vital context in which intellectual knowledge can be brought to bear. When the culture of academic life and its professional practitioners are brought into contact with the problems and issues that confront the public; when intellectuals themselves are based not only in their disciplines but in a vibrant relation to the public realm and its problems, only then will the new public mindedness restore intellectual and public life to their proper relation.

EDUCATION FOR POLITICAL LIFE

By Alejandro Sanz de Santamaria

As a university professor, I am involved in two main activities. I teach (economics and management) and I undertake research (mainly in economics). And now I find myself deeply concerned about the kind of education for political life we provide through our teaching and research activities. I suspect that through these activities we are not educating people well to take their place in democracy.

For me, a central question is this: What is urgent and important if we are to provide people with a better education for political life? Should we generate additional education activities — additional to those currently being practiced in formal academic institutions — that are directly concerned with political life; or should we radically transform the current forms in which we carry out our educational practices in all subjects, so that they effect a different, better political education? The truth is that I'd be reluctant to argue against any of the efforts being made outside the formal education institutions to improve education for political life; yet I have a strong sense that these efforts consume immense energies merely to counterbalance the *damaging* effects that formal education, as it is provided in all subjects through existing academic institutions, is having on political life in our society. Thus my hypothesis is that it is more urgent and important to work as hard as possible to transform current formal educational practices in certain new directions than it is to create additional activities to improve people's education for political life. I think a transformation in the conventional social forms of education has to take place in the classrooms at schools and universities.



Just over a decade ago, I was invited to analyze the way in which local laborers' migration patterns, in the Colombian peasant community known as Garcia Rovira, were affecting regional eco-

nomic development, and to make appropriate recommendations on an economic policy that the government could enforce in connection with migration. More recently, I have been engaged in evaluating the impact of a government economic development program that has been under way in the region for more than eight years.

A central feature of these two experiences was that the recommendations I was to produce had to be constructed from primary information collected through in-depth fieldwork and surveys. Thus in both projects the knowledge production process comprised, schematically, four "conventional" steps: a thorough analysis of available literature on this rural community; fieldwork in which different constitutive social agents of the community — peasants; landowners; merchants; state functionaries; local political, religious, and military authorities; etc. — were interviewed at length; a survey, designed and implemented in the light of the fieldwork; and, finally, the knowledge construction process itself, using all the information made thus available.

The experience was traumatic.

The available literature on Garcia Rovira when I started the first project was overwhelming: there was information on the agrological characteristics of the soil (soil qualities, steepness, altitudes over sea level, etc.), on local weather conditions (rainfall, humidity, winds, etc.), on water availability (rivers, streams, dams, and other irrigation facilities), on the regional population's size, growth rate and structure (urban, rural, age groups, etc.), on the most important crops grown in the region and the different labor processes practiced to cultivate each one of them (amount of labor time required, constitutive tasks of labor processes, production inputs needed, etc.), on the main characteristics of the markets within which the different products circulated (local, regional, national and/or international markets), on prices per product, on rural development programs that had been enforced and were being enforced by the state and other institutions, on land ownership distribution, on productivity and levels of production per product, etc.

The abundance of this information meant that it was impossible for me to use it all in my own production of knowledge; yet, at the same time, I knew that this information would have to be taken into account by any research that proved effective in procuring economic development in this community. A troubling

contradiction indeed.

Then, as I came into direct and close contact with many individuals and households in the second step of my conventional knowledge production process — the in-depth fieldwork — this contradiction became not only increasingly evident, but also increasingly problematic. The richness and complexity of the innumerable natural and social conditions under which each one of the individuals and households interviewed reproduced themselves over time, as well as the impressive differences (the heterogeneity) of such conditions among social units — which are often "homogenized" under the concept of "peasant" — progressively undermined the possibility of producing a conclusion that I could legitimately claim to be a "sound basis" for any kind of recommendation. "Recommendations" could be formally constructed, of course. But I felt a moral impediment to doing so: in the name of what "golden rule" was I to make the abstraction necessary to produce my "knowledge" and make my recommendations about what "ought to be done" to attain this community's "economic development?"

But I had to do it; there was a legal contract to which I had to respond. Thus, I had to select a "principle of organization" — a theoretical framework, a symbolic space — with which I could select and relate my "story" about Garcia Rovira. And so I did.

The complexity of the scenario I gradually perceived — of the numerous intermingled social and natural processes in which the different individuals and households interviewed participated — turned the experience of the third step of my work (the survey) into the most forceful and valuable evidence of the arbitrariness of the abstractions economists have to make. The design of the sample; the painful process of constructing the survey questionnaire; the even more painful process of collecting the information — the pain one feels in this kind of research is, I think, directly proportionate to how deeply concerned one is, as a researcher, about the future of the community under study, about the real social effects that the knowledge production process itself will have on the community. How was I to design a sample survey of approximately 500 households that would be "representative" of this community as a totality? I didn't have an answer then, and I still don't have it today!

But the sample was designed, the questionnaire was con-

structed, the survey was carried out, and the collected information was "ordered" in several computer files to be used as "raw material" to construct new knowledge about the community. I proceeded then with the fourth and final step of this conventional knowledge production process: to use all this information, collected in the three preceding steps, for the construction of new knowledge and corresponding recommendations. But the only firm conclusions I could draw from this exercise were confirmation of my own "technical" incapacity unilaterally to determine what policies would actually be effective in enhancing the development of these households. This strongly reinforced the "moral impediment" I had felt to making such "policy" recommendations. How could I unilaterally construct "knowledge" on such a complex totality, or recommend anything as "to do" in order to procure its development? On what grounds could I claim that the specific "options" I had taken throughout this long and cumbersome abstraction process were the "correct" options to procure such development effectively?

In the light of this experience, I found myself asking how was I, as a protagonist of this social process of producing knowledge, to ensure that the specific knowledge I was to produce was "adequate" for, and would be effectively and successfully used in procuring its stated beneficial ends? The radical separation in space and time between the economic knowledge production process and the social uses made of the resulting knowledge allow for the social agents producing the knowledge to be different from the social agents responsible for taking action based on it (in this case, the state). Further, there is a still more radical separation between both of these two social agents and the people directly and radically affected by the production and use of knowledge — the "investigated" community itself (in my case, the rural community of Garcia Rovira).

"... there was no communication whatsoever between science (myself as an academic economist) and society (the rural community of Garcia Rovira)."

It was clear to me that in these social forms of producing and using economic, scientific knowledge there was no communication whatsoever between science (myself as an academic economist) and society (the rural community of Garcia Rovira).

The question of the political legitimacy of conventional social forms of producing and using economic knowledge is, to me, strikingly similar to the question Paulo Freire, the well-known Brazilian educator, had to face when he called into question the legitimacy of

"conventional" forms of education. For Freire, the "conventional" form of education, which he called "banking" education,

> *becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat.... Knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry.*

Similarly, the "conventional" social forms in which economists — unilaterally, not dialogically — construct knowledge, and the separation between the production and the use of economic knowledge, transform "knowledge" into a fetishised commodity whose "production," "circulation," and "use" can be separated in space and time. In the "conventional" forms of producing and using economic knowledge, the economists isolate themselves from the communities they investigate; communication between science and society is obstructed. In the "conventional" forms of producing and using economic knowledge the investigated community's perception of its realities is always abstracted by the economist. And such a crucial abstraction is legitimized in the name of an "objective, scientific knowledge"!

This "separation" in turn produces a political effect of the utmost importance: an authoritarian power is consistently exerted by social researchers on their "investigated communities." Feyerabend was right when he denounced the intellectuals — in this case, economists — as people who "have so far succeeded ... in preventing a more direct democracy where problems are solved and solutions judged by those who suffer from the problems and have to live with the solutions.... [They] have fattened themselves on the funds thus diverted in their direction. It is time to realize that they (the intellectuals) are just one special and rather greedy group held together by a special and rather aggressive tradition...."

To develop alternative social forms for producing and using economic knowledge, in which these separations are superseded, has meant for me in my more recent work, among other things, that my responsibility as a "development economist" in front of a

community could not be limited to the conventional "academic" task of producing an economic knowledge and making a set of formal recommendations. I had to be also responsible for the use — or misuse — that would be made of this knowledge, and for the concrete social effects that the knowledge I was to produce would have (or would not have) on the community over time. In other words, my responsibilities as a "development economist" comprise the *political* problem (in the broadest sense) of how my activities as a social researcher will ultimately affect the living conditions of the community, not just the academic or technical problem of constructing knowledge to justify — in front of social agents different from the investigated community (the state, for example) — a set of formal economic policy recommendations. It has meant abandoning the comfortable position of being accountable only for "analyzing and recommending," to be held responsible, in front of the real individuals and households that constitute the community, for the concrete social effects that my produced knowledge might have on their living conditions.

But I could not assume this new responsibility unilaterally, I had to develop radically new forms of knowledge production and use: I had to start a collective reflection process to identify and thoroughly analyze (understand) a few concrete problems; to start communication between the academic economist (science) and the community (society), to achieve a collective and integrated process of knowledge production. The crucial contribution of this process has been to provide us — by "us" I mean the *new* community of peasants and academic economists that this process has been progressively engendering — with a collective experience, within which a collective knowledge about the numberless complexities of concrete problems has been constructed (by reflection) and used (in action). New channels of communication between science (academic economists) and society (the communities with which economists are doing impact evaluations of government development programs) are being constructed, out of which "new" knowledges are being produced. The conventional separation between subject and object in the production and use of knowledge has been superseded; thus, no totalitarian power is being



exerted by science on society. And the knowledge itself that is being produced is not any more a commoditied "finished" product: it is now a permanently changing process, that is increasingly becoming a constitutive element of the daily life of this "new" community.

The broader, most profound implication of this research experience as I have lived it — and made sense of it — is political: it has revealed to me the totalitarian nature of the exercise of social power that is ingrained in the conventional forms of producing and using economic knowledge. This pattern in the exercising of social power is embedded in the radical separation between, on the one hand, the few individuals who participate in the production and use of economic knowledge and, on the other, the masses of people who, in spite of being the most deeply affected by these processes, are maintained as nonparticipant objects in the production and use of this knowledge.

A second crucial matter I have learned has to do with the crucial importance of collective participation by academics and the "investigated" communities in the process of production and use of economic knowledge that will affect the living conditions of the communities. Attaining this participation requires tremendous efforts in the construction of communication channels between science (economists) and society (the "investigated" communities). These communication channels can be constructed only if economists are willing to stop ignoring (abstracting), in their research practices, the cultural complexity of how the communities they "investigate" perceive their own realities. Communication between economic science and society will not be possible unless economists understand and fully accept in their research practices Feyerabend's striking proposition: "I am not looking for new theories of science; I am asking if the search for such theories is a reasonable undertaking and I conclude that it is not. The knowledge we need to understand and to advance the sciences does not come from theories, it comes from participation."

As for the role of the academic economist, this experience has taught me that it cannot be any more that of an "external" agent in charge of the limited and comfortable task of "producing" knowledge to justify "recommendations." Such a role leads only to undesirable scenarios: the production and circulation of useless

knowledge and recommendations that nobody takes seriously; or the use of knowledge and recommendations as weapons to exert subtle but violent forms of social power through science. This second scenario — the worse of the two — is eloquently described by Michael Foucault:

> *In fact we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.*

Alan Watts, in his book, *Tao: The Watercourse Way*, observes that:

> *Government is simply an abandonment of responsibility on the assumption that there are people, other than ourselves, who can really know how to manage things. But the government, run ostensibly for the good of people, becomes a self-serving corporation. To keep things under control it proliferates laws of ever-increasing complexity and unintelligibility, and hinders productive work by demanding so much accounting on paper that the record of what has been done becomes more important than what has actually been done.*

In my long and intense research experience with economic development programs in so-called "underdeveloped" rural areas, I could clearly see happening what Watts describes. The well-intended efforts by the government's central offices to direct and control the actions of all the social agents involved in these programs — direction and control functions that are always exerted in the name of certain preconceived objectives — led inexorably to the development of rules, norms, and policies of "ever-increasing complexity and unintelligibility" that suffocated everyone — including the government institutions responsible for the development programs to begin with.

But these programs generated even more serious problems at the social and political level. One that I could see very clearly was how government actions, as they are generally conceived and implemented in these "development programs," engendered profound paternalistic relationships that, paradoxically, reproduced and deepened human underdevelopment in those communities that were supposed to be the beneficiaries, as they were led (by

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these programs) to systematically expect others (e.g., governments, experts) to solve their problems — because they were led to see themselves as "ones who do not know."

Today, I can see no essential difference between this "expanded reproduction" of human underdevelopment, through paternalism in the government's "development" programs, and what we do in the classroom when we "teach" as we usually do. The role of the "development experts" with the communities on which they carry out their research is, in this sense, very similar to the role of the "teachers" with their students. In both cases the relationship is governed by the alienating assumption that one has the knowledge that the other lacks and has to learn. This is why the concept of knowledge, and the use we make of it in both our teaching and our research activities, has become a significant political problem for me.

Again, Watts writes:

> *The game of Western philosophy and science is to trap the universe in networks of words and numbers, so that there is always the temptation to confuse rules, or laws, of grammar and mathematics with the actual operations of nature. We must not, however, overlook the fact that human calculation is also an operation of nature; but just as trees do not represent or symbolize rocks, our thoughts — even if intended to do so — do not necessarily represent trees and rocks.*

My conviction is that in our educational and social research practices we are permanently treating the concepts and ideas we "teach" and "use" as if they were "the actual operations of nature." Since in our educational institutions and research projects it is always assumed — even in many of those institutions that theoretically reject this assumption — that the teachers or researchers "know" and the students or investigated communities "don't know," the students and communities are never given opportunity to express and describe their own experiences and knowledge in their own ways and words. The education/research processes' objective is rather the opposite: to "teach" the student and communities to express themselves in the professors' and researchers' ways and words since they are, by assumption, "the ones who know."

Since the fall of 1988, I have been exploring with different teaching formats trying to create conditions in which students can

express themselves authentically. This has posed a serious challenge to my own capacity to listen to them. Both tasks — to create the conditions for them to be able to express themselves authentically and to develop my own capacity to listen to, and understand, what they want to express — have proved to be much more difficult and revealing than I could have expected: it has demanded a tremendous effort on my part to understand and transform my own biases, prejudices, and mental preconceptions as a professor, in both the content and the process of my teaching — biases, prejudices and preconceptions that, as I have gradually discovered, pervasively obstruct communication with my students and their own personal development.

Thus, embedded in, and hidden behind these concrete day-to-day human relationships — teacher-student, researcher-researched, boss-subordinate, government-civil society — there is a deep, tough, invisible, political education process that we usually ignore and/or overlook. I call this invisible education process in which people learn so thoroughly — though mostly unconsciously — "political education by experience." I want to draw a sharp distinction between this invisible political-education-by-experience and what I would call a "visible process of political education" (to refer to what we usually do in the classroom — "teaching as usual"): *there* we take given, already constructed knowledge ("networks of words and numbers") about politics — contained in books, articles, or in professors' heads — and "teach" it to our students. This kind of visible education (and the same is true of research) process is, I think, starkly separated from concrete day-to-day human experiences; and it is my feeling that because of that dichotomy, this kind of education (or research) does more harm than good. It is inevitable that together with this visible political education process — intended to affect students' (or community members') intellects — there is also an invisible political-education-by-experience process that affects students' real life in the classroom (or a community's real life in the research experience).

"But life and mind* are *thus separated in the classroom and research practices; and this separation carries with it profound and harmful contradictions."

I want to underscore that this invisible political education process is not explicitly and openly acknowledged as a constitutive part of the education or research process. But life and mind *are* thus separated in the classroom and research practices; and this separation carries with it profound and harmful contradictions.

"This is how, at the university, we end up producing tyrants who are intellectual experts on democracy."

For example, we often "teach" democratic theories in the classroom ("networks of words and numbers") while practicing, at the experiential level of teacher-student relationships ("actual operations of nature"), the nondemocratic exercise of power that is generally embedded in it. In other words, we "teach" one type of politics at the discursive level, and we "do" a different politics in our practices in the classroom. Because of this profound dichotomy between "discourse" and "practice" we lead our students to "learn" a very sophisticated "discourse" on democracy which they reproduce eloquently without changing anything at all in their day-to-day life to practice the democratic theories they are knowledgeable about. This is how, at the university, we end up producing tyrants who are intellectual experts on democracy.

Does it make sense for me to conceive, as one of my tasks, the education of others for political life? I find the notion of educating others problematic when the process of education is conceived and practiced in the conventional way — teaching as usual — of transferring a given, structured knowledge to other people through discursive means. An increasing number of experiences have shown me that when I practice this kind of education I alienate people, kill individual creativity, and bury extremely valuable knowledge and personal motivations. These kinds of educational practices operate on the assumption that the processes of "production" and "circulation" of knowledge, and then the "use" of this knowledge, are tasks that have to occupy separated moments in space and time, and be performed by different people. By doing so, by transforming knowledge into commodities, we separate the "knowledgeable people" from the "unknowledgeable people," and thus we have created the conditions under which our teaching and research practices become, in themselves, nondemocratic practices in which a totalitarian exercise of power is systematically exerted by the "knowledgeable" on the "unknowledgeable."

I am more convinced every day that it is only through my own personal self-education for political life — conceiving self-education not as a process of accumulating discursive knowledge ("networks of words and numbers") but rather as a continuous, endless practice in exploring new specific ways to

relate to people in the classroom, in my research, etc. ("the actual operations of nature") — that I can effectively recruit others — my students, my peers, my bosses, my research assistants, the members of the communities I do my research with — to join with me in a collective, continuous, and open process of educating ourselves for political life.

My work as a teacher and as a social researcher is profoundly political. I may not deal with politics and political life as subjects to be "studied" in my courses or in my research projects: there are no readings assigned on this topic, no questions in the exams that require my students to "use" any formal "knowledge" on politics and political life. Yet, in the very processes of "teaching" and "constructing knowledge," when I give a class, coordinate a meeting, collect a survey, etc., I am teaching my students and the investigated communities — teaching them in a profound way, through the experience they live out in the classroom and in research activities — much more about politics and political life than I would if these topics were dealt with as "subjects" of study in the conventional way.

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MARKETING THE MIND:

Plato and Prufrock Meet PC and TQM

By Robert Franklin Gish

"Makes it kinda tough on a guy!" are the lines from my favorite film, an obscure but great movie called "Desert Bloom." It's an account of both an apotheosis and apocalypse. And as the product of a liberal education, I think about this favorite film line a lot these days here at the continent's edge and one century's ending and another's dawning.



My Platonic pondering about light and shadow, illusion and reality, my Prufrockian angst and indecision, focus into something between worry and the blues over the converging of "Political Correctness" and "Total Quality Management," not just on the streets and in the conference room "caves" of my Central California campus but in the halls of academe generally.

More pointedly, I'm a bit down these days about what I've been asked to become, what I've been asked to do, what is "expected" of me along the winding streets of TQM and PC now leading to insidious assumptions and questions of "accountability," "productivity," and what is more and more being called and championed as "throughput," an infelicitous wrenching of words if there ever was one.

Do I dare ask an overwhelming question or two? Does it matter? Do I stand pinned and wriggling on the wall? Are the images (perhaps even my own image) on that wall, and on the graphs and charts which monitor my efforts, mere lantern shows, only shadows dancing in puppetry — at times comic, at times grotesque — just beyond the fires of the heart?

I find myself in something of a surreal world where Prufrock and Plato confront PC and TQM. Such solicitations for my conscience, (soul?), and allegiance are more compelling than I first suspected. And the extent to which I or others like me comply

with or resist what amounts to this growing political and business-oriented marketing of the mind will influence the "campus climate" of the next generations of students, including my own grandchildren. I'm no Polonious behind the arras, no Joe Doakes — and why position myself behind any real or virtual "8" ball?

I'm no William Bennett, either, but the "virtues" and the values of the process I'm absorbing worry me. The language I hear daily worries me. And most of all, I'm worried by the shadow-self visage in the morning and evening mirror.

Another concern of this posing for the posers — I've started to get regular haircuts! I'm sure it's what happens at work during the day that's the culprit in my early morning and late night reflections, my prayers and preparations. I'm certain it's what transpires during the daylight hours in administration buildings all over the nation that explains why I'm starting to shine my shoes, beginning to ask that all those new names be added to my office Rolodex — with copies of this budding "constituency list" sent to the "development" office.

The overwhelming question? Well, if I dared to ask it, it might go something like this: "Just what am I and others like me becoming? Just what are we being 'put through' as corporate management, production, and marketing strategies are adopted by universities?"

You might think, at first "titular" glance, that I'm suffering from racial and ethnic fatigue, that I'm due for a furlough from worrying about not just what is said but how it's said — politically said that is, not stylistically. You might think I'm du ome R&R after numerous skirmishes in the culture wars and my five years of combat in planning, implementing, and directing a new ethnic studies program on the battlefield of "multiculturalism."

"Why do we need all this talk about equity, diversity, pluralism, and ethnic studies?" a colleague asks. "Well, why do we need a general, a liberal education?" I ask in answer. "Precisely the point!" the colleague retorts.

"Good morning, there's a little nip in the air," I quip to a group of colleagues on the way for coffee. "Beware. Such World War II talk is potentially offensive," comes the delayed memorandum, ". . . an ethnic studies director, especially, should be more sensitive to such language."

So, yes, I've been wounded along these collegial byways but, along with my campus cohorts, I can boast of more than one scar of courage. I've counted coup too and a new department and faculty exist — recently greeted by a waiter at a local restaurant — as "no doubt some kind of all-faiths religious group?"

I've been *put through* lots of that kind of stereotyping. And I know well that ethnic studies directors are habitually and stereotypically "colored in" by any and all ethnic as well as academic, and community constituencies (students, colleagues, townspeople). To wit, when invited to the local state prison (California spends as much or more money on prisons than it does on education generally), I soon discovered that the "prisoners of color" who invited me expected someone more "visibly ethnic."

And after many such experiences, in the context of justifying an emerging discipline on or off a polytechnic campus such as the one where I work, I think, or used to believe, I could talk about "accountability" with the best of them.

Although it might be a contributing factor to my current *psychomachia* or "transformation anxiety," I can still muster the confidence to say I'm still convinced that unless we educate ourselves out of the deep racial and ethnic visages which we project on ourselves and each other, we are all doomed. That's enough to cause a morning razor nick or a sleepless night, I know. But that's not what really bothers me these strident and strapped, sartorial and soul-shifting days.



You've probably concluded that I'm suffering from some kind of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* culture crisis or future shock — the shock due an English professor recruited from the relatively streamlined and compact Iowa regents farm-fleet system to a flagship university in the California State University system, and a campus with a long and illustrious tradition and mission in engineering, architecture, and agriculture, where science and math and liberal arts are generally regarded as support programs to the professional schools.

Sure, I've been "put through" the mill in curriculum debates about general education reform and the whys and wherefores of "liberal" vs. "professional/vocational" education. But I'm still con-

vinced that general education and its concerns are the center of every university worth its corn or its saltwater, and feel relatively confident of that pervasive "truth." The reality is that I think liberal arts students should learn much more about science and technology than they do. The reality is that a polytechnic university, most especially, has a wonderful opportunity to reconcile the false dichotomy, as the late C. P. Snow discussed it, of the putative "two cultures" of art and science.

No, what's bothering me most, I'm almost convinced, is that I'm besieged by business models and expectations. More and more I look and act like a kind of hybrid accountant, public relations executive, and marketing director. Productivity formulas, delivery systems, capital campaigns, sales forces, and customer service are daily becoming not just the trappings but the substance of my job. My days are measured out in student credit units, full-time equivalencies, weighted teaching units, and spread sheets which run off the table. No more over-the-coffee conversations about "the pursuit of knowledge."

Where I used to discuss issues of grading papers and exams in courses, I'm now expected to begin with the Total Quality Management (or Total Quality Performance) premise (model?) that "the customer is always right." But which customer? Students? Alumni? Advisory boards? Where student activities used to be complementary or maybe even secondary to classroom performance, now I'm expected to promote "total environment compatibility." Where tenure and promotion committees used to be informed by deliberation and collegiality, now "advocacy and litigation thresholds" determine RPT (retention, promotion, and tenure) rulings.

I carp about such turnings on my way to my various visits to college and university councils. I keep saying: "You and I have to keep our hearts and our souls dedicated to educating students, to leading them and learning with them." I ask now and then about the old drowning ideals of teaching, service, scholarship, and research.

But I have a Prufrockian/Platonic decision to make, fast approaching with the mirror of the millennium and the imaged, virtual and real faces to face there — and it is this: "If I buy a new pinstripe suit and an attaché case, will the desert then bloom?"

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INVENTING PUBLIC SCHOLARSHIP

By David Mathews

As I understand it, the purpose of this volume is to explore the possibility that there could be a type of scholarship that might be called "public scholarship" or that "public intellectuals" may be more than scholars who give the public information. Maybe "exploring" is not quite the right term if it suggests an orderly search with a well-defined objective in mind. Maybe "groping toward" would be better. We are searching for an idea of scholarship in relation to the public that is fundamentally different from other well-known ideas. Are public scholars those who are outside the mainstream because they are involved with their community, as some of these articles suggest? Can they be recognized by the way they treat the public in their work? Maybe there is even more to a new concept of scholarship. I find myself able to identify only the outline of a dim figure on a distant terrain. Drawing on some other essays such as Tom Bender's piece on "Academic Knowledge and Political Democracy in the Age of the University," the literature on civil society, an essay by Peter Levine on "Deliberation and Technical Reasoning," as well as others I will mention along the way, here is what I think I see:[1]

First, I have noticed some people rethinking the relationship between the expert and the civil order or public, often questioning this century's dominant assumption that experts can provide us with superior knowledge and that such knowledge constitutes an authority we have to defer to because we citizens were inescapably unknowledgeable. The truth of the world is in complexities outside our experience. Tom Bender shines a new light on this relationship by questioning the distinction usually made between political truth and academic truth. Maybe the relationship between scholars and everybody else isn't a relationship between the knowledgeable and

the less than knowledgeable.

Second, and closely related, others are reexamining what knowledge is and how it is produced. Some would prefer the word "truth" to "knowledge." Personally, I am more comfortable with words that don't imply absolute certainty. I find the language of "judgment" useful because it is focused on the contextual and transitory decisions we make in public about how to act as a public. This reexamination has led to questions about one of the prevailing conventions, which is that the knower has to be (and can be) separated from what he or she is trying to know.

Third, I see people reassessing what a public is and how it functions. Some are looking at what kind of communication is essential to public life. They are finding that a deliberative dialogue is key. A deliberative dialogue has to do with both knowing and acting, seen as one phenomenon, not two. It is thinking and speaking tied together in a way that is rational but more than just rational. Any number of people are rediscovering the importance of what Pericles described as the talk we use to "teach ourselves first." I am not just referring to Habermas, but scholars like David Zarefsky at Northwestern University, and the modern rhetoricians who are reviving Mikhail Bakhtin from academic obscurity.[2]

Public life is being reincarnated as "civil society" by still another group of academics. Civil society offers a different set of lenses for looking at what makes a public choate, for getting at what Walter Lippmann missed. One of the striking features of a healthy civil society is how interconnected it is — not homogeneous, but integrated. Because modern scholarship sees life in divisions that correspond to various disciplines, there is reason to wonder if, in all its realism, the conventional academic mind misses a large chunk of reality. That thought could unsettle the foundation for organizing higher education into its usual divisions, unsettle the foundation in a way that even interdisciplinary studies can't repair.

The precipitant for the public scholars project may be the declining legitimacy, if not the collapse, of the modern state, a state rooted in the scholarship of scientific positivism and the assumptions of intellectuals turned expert. I have just read Václav Havel's address on *The Responsibility of Intellectuals*.[3] Havel lived in a state informed by a scientific expertise so infallible that if his experiences said he wasn't well off — but Those Who Knew Better

said he was — he was not to believe his lying eyes. That experience led him to conclude that the claim that human society can be known in its entirety, and that this knowledge could lead to a sure-fire strategy for reform, is not only arrogant — in the face of a world held together by "billions of mysterious interconnections" — but just flat wrong. Havel has become a champion of gradual improvements continuously modified by our shared experiences. Intellectuals have some responsibility for those improvements. They aren't, in some objective way, detached from the world and the rest of humanity, they are in it and responsible to it.

While these developments don't tell us exactly what a public scholar is, they do suggest what one is not. There are public-minded experts — modest, not arrogant — with valuable knowledge derived from modern science; and they are very useful folks if you think penicillin is better than a pinch of magic. But they aren't "public scholars" just because what they know is useful to the public at large. Neither are those who are providing the public with technical assistance based on scientific knowledge. There are also experts with knowledge derived from sources other than science such as history and literature, and they happily share their knowledge with the public. Useful as they are, I think we mean something different when we try to define public scholars.

Another category of scholars, perhaps better described as intellectuals, draws on their moral sensibilities to perform a most useful role as social critics. Where would we be without them — people like Havel himself? Still, a public scholar may be different from a scholarly critic.

The same distinction may be made between people from academe who go into government or public service and public scholars. Public scholars certainly have to be in the public arena, yet a scholar in public service isn't necessarily a public scholar.

The search to identify "public scholars" isn't an effort to distinguish good from bad scholars or even publicly useful scholars from those less than useful. While there may be people who are public scholars, this project isn't about putting a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" on particular people.

So, what are public scholars? They are, I think, defined, in part, by how they go about producing knowledge, by how they stand in relation to the public, by the kinds of questions they raise and, most of all, by the richness of their concept of public life.

One clue is that the function of this scholar is defined by the task of human society, which is to change itself continually, to effect gradual improvements, through the knowledge produced from shared experience about the necessity for change.[4] This kind of knowledge is socially constructed to answer questions that no expert can. These are questions of what *should* we do or how *should* we act in a society that has to adapt to a mysterious universe that doesn't offer us any certainty. To distinguish this kind of knowledge from other kinds, I, like Jay Rosen, use Michael Sandel's phrase, modifying it somewhat to describe not just goods known in common, but that knowledge consisting of things we can know when we are together and never alone. By "together" I don't mean just standing around, I mean so intensely engaged with one another that my experiences are joined with your experiences and we are both changed. Those experiences, as Sandel noted, come when politics works as it should. I would add that this kind of knowledge doesn't preexist the effort to create it. It isn't like an Easter egg hunt, which is also a social act. It is a knowledge about who we are and what we are willing to do that doesn't exist before you and I become a "we" or a public.

Another clue is that public scholars may be identified by the way they stand in relation to the public. Of course, these scholars have to be in public life and not outside it, though not standing on a platform to proclaim special knowledge or to criticize what goes on "below." Public scholars stand *with* other citizens. But the question is what do they do with their scholarship?



In part, they may emulate the stance of those in a relatively new and very promising field: action research. I admire this research because its source is the public and its purpose is public benefit, although not "public" in quite the way I use the word. Action researchers are very respectful of citizens and communities in gathering data and have an ethical code that requires any information be returned to its source. While the idea of "public scholars" may not be the same as the idea of action researchers, "public scholars" surely have to emulate the respect these researchers accord the public, as well as their ethics.

"Public scholars," as I imagine them, however, aren't so

much extracting information from the public as they are joined with other citizens in the creation of knowledge, a point I have just made. Their scholarly training should make them proficient in producing knowledge in a public setting, provided they are not narrowly tied to the epistemology of quantitative science and can appreciate the role of shared human experience in creating knowledge. Here is what I mean by that. If the knowledge we need to change our situation — to progress — has a moral dimension beyond the reach of expertise, then expertise is a necessary but not sufficient condition for creating it. If what we need to know doesn't preexist our coming together, then the evidence of things past, which I bring with me as a scholar, is also useful but not sufficient. And if this knowledge has to be created through the interaction of many different people, then the skills I have developed as a solitary thinker are potentially beneficial, but again not sufficient. So it is the way I have learned to create knowledge, to derive meaning, to make judgments, that I bring with me to a public setting. But I have to adapt that way of knowing to a process in which citizens engage one another, not as though they were the same with no distinctive competencies, but as political equals, all with relevant experience about what needs to change.

Answering the questions of where and how "public scholars" stand in the public becomes a bit easier if I narrow the field and look at how scholars interact with professionals who deal with the public. I have seen public scholars play a role that, as best I can describe it, is the role of a "paradigm shifter." Rather than providing information or a critique, they suggest other perspectives or a different language for understanding "the public," which is otherwise a term with very thin meaning and no power to inform professional practice. I have heard public scholars ask questions like "What is implied in our statement?" or "What would happen if we changed our language this way?" For example, in the public journalism work I have seen the power of asking, "How would we cover a story if we thought of people as citizens or 'political actors' rather than just 'readers'?" Notice that I have intentionally used "we" and "our," not "you" and "your" because public scholars must place themselves inside the profession even as they look outside it.

The questions public scholars raise will surely reflect a different concept of what a public is, or of what public life is — different from the prevailing understanding of the public. That

concept will inform their scholarship. They will be open to the possibility that a public is not a "phantom," that it exists through the dialogue it is in with itself and through the public work that grows out of that dialogue.

We have to come up with some better descriptions of the role of public scholars who are dealing with professionals trying to restructure their relationships with the public than "guru" or "technical advisor." I would describe these efforts to interrogate practice as the work of a practicing public philosopher. To me, philosophers aren't people who know about philosophy; they are those who know how to pose the questions that can reveal our relationships to the world. I hope these examples will explain why I am reluctant to equate public scholars with public critics. Critics seem more inclined to make pronouncements about the world.

I don't want to end this overview of public scholarship without mentioning another facet of this project, which is to look at the way that the public work of scholars might change the meaning of academic scholarship and alter disciplines. No one has explained these implications more directly and honestly than Alejandro Sanz de Santamaria, who is on the faculty of the University of the Andes in Bogotá, Colombia. His article on "Education for Political Life," which you can find in this issue of the *Exchange*, is an account of a soul-searching journey of a conventional economist doing research on rural communities who becomes convinced that intellectuals have to create a radically different way of producing knowledge *with*, not *for*, citizens. This requires, he says, superseding the conventional (and, he might add, "unnatural") separation of subject and object. The public experiences of a scholar like Sanz redefine academic scholarship. Research becomes the creation of knowledge with those who will use the knowledge rather than the production of knowledge by experts to be "deposited in the unknowledgeable."

Teaching becomes the same; what students experience becomes more important than what they are told. Sanz has carried his new ways of creating knowledge from the field into his classroom. He argues that formal education is damaging political life. Universities, he says, can produce tyrants who, though experts on democracy as a subject, may teach democratic theories while exercising power undemocratically in their relationships with students.

The effort to invent "public scholarship" goes on in the lives

of people who are examining their own discipline or profession in order to find a new role in a quintessentially public politics. It is a very personal, often lonely, sometimes painful quest. Some who have started on this journey are beginning to talk to one another. If you would like to be a part of the conversation, let the editors of the *Exchange* know.

References

[1] Thomas Bender, "Academic Knowledge and Political Democracy in the Age of the University," in *Intellect and Public Life: Essays on the Social History of Academic Intellectuals in the United States* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) and Peter Levine, "Deliberation and Technical Reasoning: The Role of the Humanities in a Democracy," tentatively titled in the book, *Living Without Philosophy* not yet published. The civil society literature includes not only Robert D. Putnam's book on Italy, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), but Vaughn L. Grisham's work on Tupelo, Mississippi in a book tentatively titled *It Can Be Done: The Tupelo Model* (Washington, D.C.: Rural Economic Policy Program, Aspen Institute, in press), and Victor Perez-Diaz's study of the creation of modern Spain, *The Return of Civil Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

[2] David Zarefsky in the "The Postmodern Public," published in *Kettering Review* in the fall of 1995, makes the case for deliberative public discourse as a necessity for articulating the bonds that hold people together and the vision that moves them toward their goals. Max Harris, in an essay "A Surplus of Seeing: Bakhtin, the Humanities and Public Discourse" soon to be published in a book of essays on the humanities and the public, enriches the definition of public deliberation with Bakhtin's phrase "communication between simultaneous differences."

[3] See Václav Havel's March 31, 1995, address at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand, reprinted in *New York Review of Books* 22 (June 22, 1995): 36–37.

[4] I shouldn't go on an epistemological binge here because in the last issue of *HEX*, I had an opportunity to argue that there were certain ways of knowing in academe, often associated with the humanities, that seemed very much like the knowing that is directed toward identifying common goods and that comes out of a particular kind of social/political interaction.

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